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I.

INTRODUCTION

Many states - including Missouri - have provisions that provide greater
punishment for some felonies that are committed with, or by the use of, a
.. deadly weapon" or "dangerous instrument."1 The definition o f "deadly
weapon" tends to be pretty straightforward, usually a list that includes several
specific items that just are deadly weapons, such as guns and knives.2 "Dangerous instrument" is deliberately left as a broader, more capacious term defined not in terms o f a list o f instruments but in terms of those things that
could be easily or "readily" used to cause serious physical injury or death.3
But precisely because o f the broad sweep o f what counts as a dangerous instrument, and the role circumstances can play in making something dangerous, courts in Missouri have taken widely divergent stances on the definition
of"dangerous instruments," both in general and in particular cases.
Consider the following representative cases:
'Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.
·•saint Louis University School of Law, Class of 2018. The authors thank Joe Welling for comments on an earlier draft.
I. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT.§ 571.015.1 (Cum. Supp. 2017) ("Armed criminal
action" when "any person who commits any felony under the Jaws o f this state by,
with, or through the use, assistance, or aid of a dangerous instrument or deadly weapon . . . ,"); MO. REV. STAT.§ 570.023.1(2)--{3) (Cum. Supp. 2017) (Robbery in the
first degree is defined as the forcible stealing o f property when a person is '"anned
with a deadly weapon .. or '"[u]ses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous instrument against any person.").
2. A deadly weapon in Missouri is defined as ·•any fircann, loaded or unloaded,
or any weapon from which a shot, readily capable of producing death or serious physical injury, may be discharged. or a switchblade knife, dagger. billy club. blackjack or
metal knuckles.'' Mo. REV. STAT.§ 556.061(22) (Cum. Supp. 2017).
3. A dangerous instmmcnt in Missouri is ·•any instnunent, article or substunce,
which, under the circumstances in which it is used, is readily capable of cm1sing death
or other serious physical injury." Id. § 556.061(20).
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Case I: A drunk driver rides through a heavily trafficked pedestrian area
in the middle o f the night. He hits someone and is charged, not just with second degree (reckless) assault but also with committing a felony with a dangerous instrument - his vehicle. The court, in affirming the conviction on the
second charge, reasons that the car in these circumstances was an "instrument" that was "readily capable o f causing death or physical injury" and that
the driver knew that at the time, even though he might not have intended to
use his car as a dangerous instrument. Is this right? Are cars always dangerous instruments, or just in some cases? Should it matter that the driver did
not intend to cause serious physical injury or death by driving and was at
most merely reckless?4
Case 2: A man uses an ice pick to shred the tires o f his former lover's
car. The ice pick, everyone concedes, could in almost any circumstance be
used to cause someone serious physical injury, or even kill them. But at the
time o f the tire shredding, no one was in the area. Based on this fact, the
court concludes that the ice pick was not "readily capable" o f causing someone serious physical injury. Is this right? What if someone suddenly came
upon the man while he was using the ice pick - would the proximity o f the
person transform the ice pick into a dangerous instrument? What if the man
had an accomplice with him? And why is the risk to the person holding the
ice pick not enough? Or is the better rule that an ice pick is always a dangerous instrument, even i f someone is not around?5
Case 3: A person repeatedly hits someone with his fist, causing that person serious physical injury. He is charged with assault by use o f a dangerous
instrument - his hands. A court affirms the conviction. Is this right? Are
hands really "instruments"? And again, what makes them dangerous: does a
person have to intend his hands and fists (or elbows or feet) to be used as
dangerous instruments to make them so? ls it an easier case, or the same
case, if the person has a prosthetic arm? What if the person is wearing leather
gloves (or even a ring), which would add to the harmfulness o f the injury but only imperceptibly? Do the gloves then become the dangerous instruments? 6
Missouri courts have not provided consistent guidance on how to proceed in these cases, although in recent years, some judges have urged rather
broad understandings o f "dangerous instrument."7 But courts should not aim
4. The facts here are based on State v. Jacobson, No. WD 79472, 2017 WL
2118655 (Mo. Ct. App.), transfer de11ied, (Mo. Oct. 5, 2017).
5. The facts here are based on State v. Baumann, 217 S.W.3d 914 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2007).
6. 111c facts here arc based on State v. Evans, 455 S.W.3d 452 (Mo. Ct. App.
2014).
7. One judge has explicitly urged a broad reading o f Missouri's related Anncd
Criminal Action statute, which makes it an additional crime if one commits a felony
with a dangerous instrument or deadly weapon. See State v. Jones, 479 S.W.3d 100,
106 (Mo. 2016) (en bane) (Wilson, J.) (Armed Criminal Action statute "was intended
to reach as broadly as possible."). We touch on this related issue in Part V.
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at a broad reading unless that is actually the proper reading o f the statute, and
it is not clear that a broad reading here is the correct one. Moreover, in the
context o f criminal law especially, an overly broad reading o f a statute can
lead to problems o f vagueness. People should not be left to guess what things
or objects (or body parts) are or are not dangerous instruments. An easy fix
to the vagueness problem is to require that the offender have the purpose o f
causing serious physical injury or death by means o f the instrument. Even i f a
dangerous instrument can be any number o f things, it is enough to put people
on notice that i f they use a thing with the purpose o f causing serious physical
injury or death, then they will face a greater punishment - because they will
have made the thing into a dangerous instrument by their intention. In this
paper, we urge courts to embrace this "intentional" reading o f what makes
something a dangerous instrument.
This paper proceeds in three parts. Part II gives an overview o f the development o f the law on dangerous instruments in Missouri, mainly by contrasting dangerous instruments with deadly weapons. As noted above, deadly
weapons are (in Missouri) mostly just listed, and it is clear from that list that
there are some things that are harmless (e.g., an unloaded gun) but still count
as deadly weapons. By comparison, dangerous instruments are things that are
not necessarily dangerous but could become dangerous. But what circumstances make something "dangerous"? The stakes involved in defining dangerous instruments can be high. In Missouri, adding an Armed Criminal Action ("ACA") conviction on top o f a felony conviction can add years - or
even decades - to a sentence. 8
Part I1I looks at some o f the puzzles that have developed in the law
based on the three cases listed above. Some courts in Missouri give an expansive reading o f what circumstances make a thing dangerous, some tend in
the direction that some things are in fact inherently dangerous, and some (the
approach we favor) look to the purpose for which a person is using the instrument to determine whether in those circumstances it is "dangerous." The
problems in defining "dangerous instruments," in fact, arc deep and wideranging - because courts seem to disagree on almost every aspect of"dangcrous instrument." Which circumstances are most salient in deciding when
something is "dangerous"? What is an i11st111ment? The point o f this Part is
mostly to show the variety o f conflicting rules appellate courts have devised
in this area and to identify what seems to us the consensus approach.
In the final Part, we present difficulties with the way the statute is currently
being interpreted and offer a defense o f our favored interpretation o f the statute. The current interpretation faces two problems: it is hopelessly vague and
it leads to absurd results. That is, the current interpretation leaves people to
guess what is a dangerous instrument because under the right conditions almost a11ytli i11g could be. And this ambiguity leads to courts calling all sorts
o f things dangerous instruments, things that the legislature could not have

8. See infra Part II.
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possibly intended to be captured by the tenn "dangerous instrument."9 The
solution to this, as already intimated above, is to restrict dangerous instruments only to those which we can show that the person i111e11ded to use in a
way that would cause serious physical injury or death.
This Article is about the interpretation o f a particular Missouri statute
(although o f a kind that is present in many other statutes), but it is also about
something broader: what lawyers and scholars have called overcrimi11alization. w One problem with the complaint that American law is "overcriminalized" is that it can make sense on an abstract level but can fall apart when we
get to particular examples. Which laws are unjust and need to be repealed?
Once we get past some obvious candidates - drug laws, for example, or some
minor (and silly) regulatory crimes 11 - it becomes harder to say which criminal laws are excessive. Certainly no one is eager to repeal laws on anned
robbery or sexual assault. But with Missouri's ACA law, we believe we have
an easy candidate for elimination and almost a perfect example o f overcriminalization. The statute is redundant, construed broadly by the courts, and
amounts in many cases to extremely lengthy sentences. In the end, legislatures are mostly responsible for attacking the phenomenon o f overcriminalization. Our Article suggests, however, that courts can also properly play a
role in giving narrow interpretations o f these statutes, especially when a narrow reading is not only reasonable but probably correct.
I I . D E A D L Y W E A P O N S , DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTS, A N D A R M E D
CRIMINAL ACTION

Deadly weapons and dangerous instruments statutes usually occupy one
o f two roles: they either are part o f defining a crime itself or they exist as part
9. Consider the statement of one judge in a case before it was common to find
cars were "dangerous instruments":
By the state's argument a defendant convicted of involuntary manslaughter
through reckless operation of an automobile could be separately tried for
[A]nned [C]riminal [A)ction for the same killing. I do not believe that the
legislature had this kind of a situation in mind when it passed the (A)nned
[C]riminal [A]ction statutes.
State e:c rel. Bulloch v. Seier, 771 S.W.2d 71, 76 (Mo. 1989) (en bane) (Blackmar, J.,
concurring), overntled en ba11c by State v. Blackman, 968 S.W.2d 138 (Mo. 1998)
(per curiam).
10. Todd Haugh, O,·ercriminuli:ution 's New Hurm Paradigm, 68 V AND. L. REV.
1191 (2015).
11. See, e.g .. Paul Larkin & John•Michael Seibler, Time to P11111e the Tree: The
Need to Repeal U1111ecessary Cri111i11al Laws, HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 25, 2016),
https://www.hcritagc.org/crimc-and-justice/rcport/timc-prunc-the-tree-the-necdrepeal-unneccssary-criminal-laws (listing crimes such as "transport(ting] dentures
across state lines" and "scll[ing] malt liquor labeled 'pre-war strength'" as examples
of laws to be repealed).
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of a separate penalty-enhancement statute. For the fonner, first-degree robbery might be defined as a forcible stealing by use o f a deadly weapon or
dangerous instrument. 12 For the latter, an additional penalty may be added
onto a crime i f it were a crime that was committed with a dangerous instrument or deadly weapon.13 A person might be convicted o f kidnapping, then
have several years added onto her sentence because the crime was accomplished through the use o f a gun or knife.' 4 In Missouri, the state employs its
deadly weapons and dangerous instrument provisions in both ways - that is,
as both part o f substantive crimes and as a way to increase sentences - and
both can be used at the same time. A person can be charged with first-degree
robbery, which carries with it a certain sentence and then also charged with
the crime o f Anned Criminal Action - basically committing a crime with a
deadly weapon or dangerous instrument - which adds an additional sentence
o f three years. Despite being a separate criminal statute (rather than part o f
the state's sentencing machinery), the courts, including the United States
Supreme Court, have treated Missouri's ACA statute as a sort o f sentencingenhancement provision, thus removing any double jeopardy problem when a
person is convicted both o f committing a robbery with a deadly weapon and
committing a felony with a deadly weapon.15
Deadly weapons and dangerous instruments are defined separately, and
the separate definitions can give us insight into how to interpret each phrase.
"Deadly weapons" is a relatively specific list o f particular "weapons," whereas "dangerous instruments" is open-ended, and context is necessary to determine whether a given object is dangerous or not. 16 As a result, it is relatively
easy to figure out whether something is or is not a deadly weapon - just
check the list to see - and comparatively harder to assess whether something
is a dangerous instrument because doing so requires looking at a variety o f
factors to sec whether this object is in these circumstances a dangerous instrument. This Part sharpens the contrast between the two technical terms,
which gives us some insight into the proper understanding of "dangerous
instrument" and how - i f it is possible - to give some shape and limit to that
term.

12. Mo. REV. STAT.§ 570.023 (Cum. Supp. 2017).
13. Mo. REV. STAT.§ 571.015 (Cum. Supp. 2017).
14. See id.
15. As the Supreme Court held, "[S]imply because two criminal statutes may be
construed to proscribe the same conduct under the Blockb11rger test docs not mean
that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes the imposition, in a single trial, o f cumulative punishments pursuant to those statutes." Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368
(1983).
16. Compare Mo. REV. STAT. § 556.061(22) (Cum. Supp. 2017), will, id. §
556.061(20).
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A. Deadly Weapons
Missouri defines a deadly weapon as "any firearm, loaded or unloaded,
or any weapon from which a shot, readily capable o f producing death or serious physical injury, may be discharged, or a switchblade knife, dagger, billy
club, blackjack or metal knuckles." 17 The list is fairly straightforward, although it requires some commentary. The group o f weapons can be divided
into four kinds: firearms or, more generally, something that can "discharge" a
"shot"; knives or pointed objects o f various sorts; bludgeons; and finally,
metal knuckles. There is no additional clause that allows for things o f a similar sort; the item is either on the list, or it is not. But still, there are some ambiguities, both in the statute and in the subsequent case law, which make even
the closed list o f "deadly weapons" not always capable o f an easy interpretation.
First, consider weapons that are like the objects on the list, but not identical to them. What about a kitchen knife, or a butcher knife, or (more generically) a knife that is not a switchblade knife? Do they count as deadly weapons? A straightforward answer would be that because these types of knives
are not specifically enumerated on the list, they would not be included - or
better, they would be the types o f knives that might be dangerous instruments,
but not deadly weapons. But Missouri courts have nonetheless found in some
cases that objects that are close enough to be "daggers" are close enough to
be deadly weapons rather than dangerous instruments. 18 In one case, a toy
sword was found to be a "dagger" even though it, in fact, was nothing o f the
sort - it was not designed for cutting, or realty for doing any o f the things
ordinary daggers could do. It was meant to be a toy. 19 So it seems that de17. § 556.061(22).
IS. The Supreme Court of Missouri held,
It is very clear that the legislature has now stated that "knife" under some
circumstances and for some purposes means "dagger."
Logic is repelled by a contention that a knife, seven to eight inches long
with a four to five inch blade, can never be considered to be a dagger. Certainly some knives under some circumstances may be used as, and may reasonably be considered to be daggers and deadly weapons.
State v. Martin, 633 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Mo. 1982); accord State v. Brookins, 410 S.W.3d
706, 709 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
19. As the court of appeals explained:
Our examination of the replica sword reveals that it is made of solid metal
and is 22 J/2 inches long when me:isured from the tip of its blade to the bottom of its hilt. The bl:ide is l 8 inches long. It weighs more th:in a pound. It
has a sharp point :ind sharpened edges. When referring to the replica sword in
closing argument. defense counsel stated, "It's a toy. It's heavy. It's pointy.
It's still a toy. It's not a de:idly weapon. :ind it's not a dagger." We disagree.
The jury could readily detcnnine that it had a hilt (or handle). a fixed blade,
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spite the list-like nature o f the definition, courts will interpret the statute as
implicitly covering those things that are "like" the others on the list. "Dagger," especially, has been thought to be sufficiently capacious to cover anything that has a blade. 20
Second, note that the deadly weapons statute has something that the
dangerous instrument definition (discussed below) has also. It says that some
items will be counted as deadly weapons if they can discharge a shot that is
"readily capable o f producing death or serious physical injury."21 In particular, even though something is not exactly a firearm, if it is something that can
discharge a shot that could cause death or serious physical injury, it will fall
under the deadly weapon provision. But this condition - a non-fireann must
still be capable o f "shooting" - requires us to determine what it means for " a
shot" to be readily capable o f causing the injury. The wording is a bit awkward, but we can see what is meant. Consider something like a slingshot.
The slingshot could be used to discharge a shot, say a rock, and that rock
could cause serious physical injury, if not death - but perhaps it would have
to be the case that there was actually a rock in the slingshot. An unloaded
slingshot might not be enough to qualify as a "deadly weapon."22
sharpened edges, and a sharp point. Whatever one chooses to call it, it meets
the Martin description o f "a short weapon with a sharp point used for stabbing" and satisfies most of the characteristics ofa dagger set forth in Pay11e.
State v. Harrell, 342 S.W.3d 908, 914 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Martin, 633
S.W.2d at 81) (citing State v. Payne, 250 S.W.3d 815, 820-21 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008)).
20. Although one appeals court has resisted this trend and cautioned against an
overly broad reading o f "dagger":
While the Missouri Supreme Court has described "dagger" as a "short
weapon with a sharp point used for stabbing," we do not believe that they intended that tcnn to cover every possible short, pointed weapon. Martin, 633
S. W.2d at 81. In each case cited by the Stale where a court uses this definition
to describe the weapon in question, the court was describing a knife of some
variety. See id. at 82 (knife between seven and eight inches long); [State v.
Chowning. 866 S.W.2d 165, 168...{i9 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)] (pocket knife of
undetermined dimensions which was displayed to the jury but not contained in
the record on appeal); [State v. Maynard. 714 S.W.2d 552, 557 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986)] (long knife with a "very dagger-type blade"). While the definition was
practical when applied to knives, it is overbroad when read without context o f
the particular factual situation to which it was applied.
Payne, 250 S.W.3d at 821.

21. § 556.061(22).
22. As one court has indeed concluded, in distinguishing between an unloaded
fireann and a "stoneless slingshot": "[t]hus, by statutory definition, an unloaded fircann is a deadly weapon while an arrowless bow, an empty pellet gun or a stoneless
slingshot which arc not readily capable o f discharging and causing death or serious
physical injury arc not deadly weapons." State v. Straw, 742 S.W.2d 579, 581 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1987).
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This leads us to the third, and probably most important, observation
about deadly weapons. It seems key that the item is on the list and also that
most o f the time it can cause serious physical injury or death. But this does
not always have to be the case. An unloaded gun, to take the most obvious
example, cannot cause death or serious physical injury (at least if it is being
used as a gun, as opposed to a bludgeon). Firearms that are unloaded, however, are included on the list. Nor does the list say that a dagger or a switchblade knife must be sharp rather than dull. The list o f deadly weapons seems,
in other words, to contain things that are intrinsically dangerous. And it is
this fact that deadly weapons are intrinsically dangerous, as one can put it,
which contrasts them most directly with dangerous instruments. 23

B. Dangerous lnstruments
Under Missouri statute, a dangerous instrument is defined as "any instrument, article or substance, which, under the circumstances in which it is
used, is readily capable o f causing death or other serious physical injury.''24
Already we can see that this definition will be more difficult to interpret than
the one given for "deadly weapons." The deadly weapons statute, at least at
first look, gives a simple list and leaves the fact finder only to ask, "Was the
thing used on the list or not?" But for dangerous instruments, the inquiry is
significantly more open-ended. 25 The fact finder has to make an inquiry, not
only into the nature o f the object but, just as importantly, into the nature o f
the situation. The inquiry is not only about "what this thing is." It is also
about what this thing is in the context o f the overall situation, which may
include features outside o f the person using the instrument but also (and
maybe essentially) features about the person's own, subjective mental state.

23. This focus on intention and "actual use" has been well put by one court:
fn contrast to its decision to define what constitutes a "dangerous instrument"
by the manner in which the item is used, the legislature chose to dctennine
what constitutes a deadly weapon by setting forth a list of specific items.
Whether an item constitutes a deadly weapon docs not depend upon either its
intended or actual use by the defendant.

Hurrell, 342 S.W.3d at 915.
24. § 556.061(20).
25. One court stated:
Dangerous instruments, on the other hand, can be virtually any item. They arc
not enumerated by statute and become dangerous instruments when used in a
manner where the object is readily capable o f causing death or other serious
physical injury. Narrow descriptive words define one set o f items and the particular manner o f use defines the other set o f items.
Payne, 250 S.W.3d at 819.
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There seem to be, in fact, four main inquiries that the fact finder must make
in deciding whether something is or is not a dangerous instrument.
First, there is the question o f what counts as an "instrument, article, or
substance." It is unclear whether these three words provide any limitation at
all on what can count as a dangerous instrument. One issue, which can give
courts trouble, is whether a body part can be an instrument, article, or substance.26 A boot may be an "instrument," but what about a hand or a foot or
an elbow? Does the instrument, article, or substance have to be o f a certain
size, such that it can be held by someone - perhaps, as the person makes the
assault that causes physical injury or death? This would seem to rule out
cars, but Missouri courts have repeatedly held that cars can be dangerous
instruments.27 Moreover, what exactly is an article or a substance? Here
again, we face the problem that almost anything could be an article, although
"substance" could be limited to powders or chemicals o f some sort.28 It is
hard to say.
The second inquiry is the nature o f the instrument or substance or article
itself. 29 Does the object have sharp edges? Is it blunt? Is it heavy? Some
things do not seem even in the universe o f things that could ever be "dangerous." A sunflower does not seem to be something that could readily harm
someone unless it was used as a sort o f poison.30 A baseball bat, however,
does look like the type o f thing that could hurt someone - although w e would
still need to analyze the context in which it was being used (picked up during
a fight, picked up by the batter on deck in a baseball game, etc.). This leads
us to the next inquiry.
Third, the factfinder has to assess what the relevant circumstances of use
are, so as to make an object "dangerous." These again seem hard to pin down
exhaustively, although w e may list some obvious circumstances. A relevant
circumstance may be how the object was held (was the pencil being pressed
against someone's neck?), or the words that were said by the person holding
the object ("give it to me or I'll stab you with this pen"). More generally, the
mental state o f the person using the object could be considered. Was the per26. State v. Evans, 455 S.W.3d 452, 453 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (discussing
whether a hand or fist can qualify as a dangerous instrument).
27. See i11fra Part III.
28. One court has found gasoline to be a dangerous instrument: "(w]hile a bottle
o f gasoline may be innocuous in the ordinary sense when used for a hannless purpose, it can readily be transmogrified into a dangerous instrument when employed in
a threat to use it as an explosive to produce physical harm." State v. Anderson, 663
S.W.2d412,416(Mo. Ct. App.1983).
29. "l11e first factor involved is the nature o f the instrument itself." City o f Independence v. Young, 760 S.W.2d 909,910 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
30. A variety o f commonly eaten fruits and vegetables have poisonous parts.
Both apples and cherries have poisonous seeds, and all parts o f sunflower plants arc
somewhat toxic i f copious quantities are consumed. Cindy Haynes, Pote11tial{v Poisonous
ST.
(Feb.
IOWA
Pla11ts,
U.
21,
2003),
https://hortncws.cxtcnsion.iastatc.cdu/2003/2-21-2003/poison.html.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,

9

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. :2 (J. Art. 5

268

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

son acting recklessly or even purposely with regard to the object and the prospect o f the object causing harm, or was the person oblivious to the fact that
(for example) the chainsaw was on and running? Another obvious circumstance could be simply whether there was a person or people around so that
someone was at risk o f being hurt or killed by use o f the object. Although the
verb "use" might suggest some intentional use o f the object qua dangerous
instrument,3' courts have interpreted use very broadly, almost in the sense o f
"handled" or "held" or even "controlled."32
The fourth inquiry (one which is related to the second and third) is
whether, given the circumstances, the object was in fact "readily" capable o f
causing serious physical injury or death. Here we reach another important
contrast to the deadly weapons provisions. Only certain things can be deadly
weapons, but a lot o f things potentially can be dangerous instruments - a pen,
a piece o f rope, a boot, a car. The question is not whether, given the circumstances, the object was just capable in the abstract o f being dangerous but
whether, in these circumstances, an immediate risk o f serious physical injury
or death was created. So the fact finder should ask whether the thing was
dangerous and also whether the thing had a real, present, and actual capability
to cause serious physical injury or death. Note how (in a way similar to the
focus on the circumstances o f "use") this shifts the inquiry from whether
something is intrinsically dangerous - like a gun, where the legislature has
said that guns are everywhere and always deadly, even when unloaded - to
whether something is dangerous in this situation, that is, in this immediate
situation. If that were not the case, then anything that was in the abstract
capable o f causing death or serious physical injury would automatically be
considered a dangerous instrument, regardless o f the circumstances. But the
legislature, by specifying that the object has to be "readily capable" o f harm,
rejected this interpretation. 33
But there is, nonetheless, an underlying unity that links deadly weapons
and dangerous instruments. We might say that dangerous instruments a,-e
deadly weapons given the circumstances. The legislature is attuned to how
"weapons" make a dangerous circumstance all the more dangerous. Some
objects are always weapons; that is just what they arc - they are made to
shoot things at people or to stab people. Other objects, however, become (in
a manner o f speaking) weapons. The question, then, is when does an "instrument, article, or substance" become a weapon? That is, what circumstances turn an ordinary object into something that acts like a weapon that is
on the list o f "deadly weapons."

31. A point we return to later in the Article.
32. See i11fra Parts Ill and IV.
33. See State v. Williams, 126 S.W.3d 377, 384 (Mo. 2004) (en bane).
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C. Armed Criminal Action
Although the main purpose o f this Article is to unpack what a dangerous
instrument is, especially as opposed to a deadly weapon, it may help to further contextualize the inquiry by looking at how the terms operate as part o f
Missouri's ACA statute - perhaps the most frequent context in which the
terms are explicated. Under the ACA statute, a person is guilty o f Armed
Criminal Action if that person commits a felony "by, with, or through the use,
assistance, or aid o f a dangerous instrument or deadly weapon."34 Again, the
ACA acts as a sort o f sentencing enhancement to felonies - if one commits a
felony with a deadly weapon or dangerous object, more years are added to
one's sentence.35 But the statute presents us with obvious, additional interpretive difficulties, especially in the case o f dangerous instruments.
For starters, what does it mean to commit a crime with a deadly weapon
or dangerous instrument, in the various ways that the statute enumerates (by,
with, through the use, assistance, or aid ot)? Consider a situation in which a
person shoots another with a gun - there, the actual crime is committed by a
deadly weapon. A harder case is when one commits a crime when a person
merely has a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument with him or her at the
time. It would seem that if one has a gun on one's person and, for example,
steals something valuable, then one may be guilty o f committing a crime with
a deadly weapon. But courts have ruled this out by joining the "by, with and
through" language with "use, assistance, or aid o f a dangerous instrument."36
That is, one must actually have used or been assisted or aided by the deadly
weapon or dangerous instrument. It is not enough that it is merely 011 one's
person at the time the crime was committed.
Does this help matters? It does limit the reach o f the ACA statute in
some deadly weapons cases, but this limit has been easily taken away by
courts that see people as being emboldened when they carry a gun, even when
the gun is not used.37 However, it is not clear that this reading also applies to
34. Mo. REV. STAT.§ 571.015 (Cum. Supp. 2017).
35. O f course, there is the possibility that the years will run concurrently, rather
than consecutively.
36. As one court o f appeals has stated,
It follows that, in order for Appellant to have committed ACA in the
course o f committing first-degree burglary, as that crime was charged
here, he must have gained entry "by, with, or through the use, assistance,
or aid o f ' the rifle, most likely in a manner similar to one imagined and
described to the trial court by the prosecutor, and a person not participating in the crime . . . must have been present in the home when Appellant
entered.
State v. Carpenter, 109 S.W.3d 718, 723 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
37. A clear example o f this is found in Jones, although Jo11es involved a "deadly
weapon" and not a dangerous instrument:
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cases o f dangerous instruments - for a dangerous instrument is defined by the
context in which it is used, and a dangerous instrument that is safely tucked
away, not easily reachable by the person, would not be "readily capable" of
causing death or serious injury. Again, the difference between deadly weapons and dangerous instruments is crucial here. A deadly weapon is always a
deadly weapon, and so within the case o f an ACA/deadly weapon charge, the
question is whether one used the deadly weapon or was aided or assisted by
having it. In the case o f an ACA/dangerous instrument charge, the question
is more complicated because we first have to consider whether, in the context,
the instrument was readily capable o f causing serious physical injury or death
and then we have to decide whether the person committing the felony used
the instrument or was assisted or aided in his or her felony by using it.
On this point, we can notice another split in the case law. When one uses a deadly weapon to break into a house, say by shooting the lock on a door
open, then the case is relatively straightforward - one has used the deadly
weapon in the process o f committing a felony (a burglary). There is no need
to show that the deadly weapon was used in a way that might cause hann
because deadly weapons are always deadly weapons, no matter the context.
(Remember that even an unloaded gun counts as a deadly weapon.) But dangerous instruments are different. I f one uses an axe to break open a door, that
is not necessarily enough for an ACA/dangerous instrument conviction because in those circumstances the use o f the axe may not be enough to make it
"readily capable" o f causing serious physical injury or death, and to think that
it is enough by itself is to fall into the trap o f turning some dangerous instruments into deadly weapons. Consider the case in which one merely uses an
axe to break open a door when no one else is around and then discards the
axe. This would likely not be enough to show A CA/dangerous instrument. 38
Compare this to the case where one shoots open a lock with a gun and then
discards it, which would presumably be enough to show ACA/dead(v weap011.

Herc, Jones unlawfully entered C.H. 's garage with a gun in his hands.
The jury reasonably could infer that the gun "aided" or "assisted" Jones by
bolstering his confidence to enter a garage that he knew might be occupied.
1l1e weapon provided "aid" or ''assistance" by giving Jones both the ready
means to overcome any resistance and the assurance that the mere presence of
the gun would prevent or deter such resistance in the first instance. It docs not
mallcr whether such resistance occurs, or even whether anyone who might
have offered such resistance actually saw him cross the threshold. The jury
reasonably could infer that Jones crossed that threshold with the "aid" or "assistance" of his gun because the gun bolstered Jones' confidence in making
the unlawful entry.
Stale v. Jones, 479 S.W.3d 100, 109 (Mo. 2016) (en bane).
38. For reasons we will get into later in this Article, it is especially relevant here
that no one was around who was "readily capable" o f being injured b y the axe. See
Mo. REV. STAT. § 556.061.20 (Cum. Supp. 2017).
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O f course, it may be easy enough to show in other circumstances that an
axe is, in fact, a dangerous instrument - maybe it can be shown that the person was also planning to wield the axe to threaten anyone he or she saw inside the house. The point is not that the axe is not, in this case, a dangerous
instrument; rather, it is to show that it is not automatically a dangerous instrument. One has to make a further showing apart from showing that the
object was used in the commission o f a crime (a showing one does not have
to make in the case o f deadly weapons), viz., that in the circumstances, the
object was readily capable o f causing serious physical injury or death and so
qualifies as a dangerous instrument. But we are getting into some o f the puzzles presented by dangerous instruments, and we should now address them
more directly.

III. CARS, ICE PICKS, AND FISTS
This Part aims to show that, fairly quickly, we can get into interpretive
muddles when unpacking the term "dangerous instrument," especially in the
context o f the ACA statute. Dangerous instruments, as we have seen, include
ordinary things that have very ordinary uses and so are not always ..dangerous."39 What makes them dangerous is the context in which they are u s e d where, in context, the objects become "readily capable" o f causing serious
physical injury or even death to other people. The problem is that, if w e become too generous when we identify the circumstances in which ordinary
objects become dangerous instruments; that is, i f we don't take care to narrow
those circumstances appropriately, then it turns out that many ordinary objects are in fact dangerous nearly all the time. When we do this, all sorts o f
things that are dangerous only in limited circumstances tum into things that
are almost always dangerous.40 As we argue in the third part, as the statute
becomes more broad - to include more things as "dangerous" - it loses its
39. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 611 S.W.2d 384, 386-87 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (noting that under the older version o f the statute, leather-sole shoes, rocks, hoe handles,
and champagne bottles had been declared dangerous weapons); see also State v.
Reese, 436 S.W.3d 738, 742 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (pencil); Stale v. Rousselo, 386
S.W.3d 919,924 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (ceramic bowl); State v. Coram, 231 S.W.3d
865, 868 {Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (telephone); State v. Arnold, 216 S.W.3d 203, 209
(Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (ink pen); State v. Eoff, 193 S.W.3d 366, 374 (Mo. Ct. App.
2006) (piece o f wood); State v. Goodman, 496 S.W.2d 850, 852 n.l (Mo. 1973)
(champagne bottle); State v. Carpenter, 72 S.W.3d 281, 284 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002)
(handcuffs); State v. Burch, 939 S.W.2d 525, 530 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (elbow); State
v. Tankins, 865 S.W.2d 848, 851-52 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (butter knife); State v.
Terrell, 751 S.W.2d 394,396 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (beer bottle); State v. Seagraves,
700 S.W.2d 95, 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (metal bar); State v. Davis, 611 S.W.2d 384,
386-87 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (metal sign nailed to a wooden board attached to a
stake).
40. We should be clear that our argument is not that courts always hold that these
things arc dangerous instrumenlS; it is that the logic o f their decisions does not provide a principled way to prevent these things from becoming "dangerous."
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distinctiveness vis-a-vis the other statutory term, "deadly weapon." It also
threatens to make the statute vague.
The strategy for the remainder o f this Article is two-fold. In this Part,
we proceed by examining the three cases we started with - cases, in fact, that
happened in Missouri and led some courts to get themselves into interpretive
difficulties in deciding them. We try to tease out the possible absurd conclusions that can come about when one pursues an overly broad interpretation o f
"dangerous instrument," as some courts have done when interpreting these.
In the next Part, w e offer a rather simple solution, a solution some courts
have offered, in order to remove most o f the absurd results and to give a coherent sense to the statute. That solution involves isolating a crucial circumstance that courts must consider when deciding whether something is a dangerous instrument, which is the intelll with which the person uses that object.
In many cases, this is what courts are already doing implicitly; that is, they
are already taking the fact that a person was purposely using the object in
such a way to cause physical injury or death as good and possibly decisive
evidence that the (ordinary) object had become a dangerous instrument. But
courts are not as transparent as they could be. When they are, they usually
reach the right result. When they are not, or when they do not consider purpose or intent at all, they fall into the interpretive muddles that we point out
in this Part. The addition o f purpose solves most o f the interpretive muddles
and, more importantly, provides the adequate notice ordinary people need to
be able to steer clear o f additional criminal punishment - the punishment that
comes from using an ordinary object in a way intended to create a risk o f
serious physical injury or death.
A . A r e Cars Dangerous l11st111me111s?

A recent case from 2017, Jacobson, illustrates well some o f the key interpretive challenges faced by judges when construing what is or is not a dangerous instrument:H The facts are, briefly, thcse. 42 A man after the close o f a
basketball game exited the gym where the game was played. He was intoxicated, and it was late at night. He nonetheless got into his car and began to
drive through a heavily congested pedestrian area (the other fans were leaving
the arena at the same time). Although he was not driving very fast, he hit and
injured a mother and her child who were crossing at a crosswalk. He was
charged with second degree assault and also (predictably) with Armed Criminal Action - committing a felony (the assault charge) with a dangerous
weapon, viz., his car.43 He was convicted, and the conviction was affinned
on appeal.

41. State v. Jacobson, 526 S.W.Jd 228 (Mo. Ct. App.), transfer denied, (Mo.
Oct. 5, 2017).
42. Id. at 230-31.
43. Id. at 231.
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Jacobson is just one in a long line o f cases in which cars were found to
be dangerous instruments.4 4 Nonetheless, the court in Jacobson took pains to
point out the unique facts o f the case: it is not that cars are always dangerous
instruments, but under these circumstances, this car was.45 The driver was
drunk, he was driving late at night, and the area was crowded. He was reckless. In these circumstances, even though he may not have intended to use
the car as an instrument to cause serious physical injury or death, he clearly
knew that the car - again, in those circumstances - was readily capable o f
causing serious physical injury or death. And this "knowledge" requirement,
the Supreme Court o f Missouri has held, is all that is needed. That is, i f one
does not intend to use a car as a dangerous instrument, one does have to know
that a car is readily capable o f causing serious physical injury or death to
satisfy the definition o f "dangerous instrument."46 The facts o f Jacobson
satisfy this condition - they show that the man did know (or that a jury could
reasonably find that he knew) that the car could easily have killed or badly
hurt someone given that he was drunk, it was night, and he was driving in a
crowded pedestrian area.
The requirement that one "know" that a car is capable o f causing serious
physical injury or death may seem to constrain the application o f the statute.47
It gives the appearance o f requiring the fact finder to show that the person
who was driving the car had an awareness o f its deadly capability, and this
means pointing to those facts that ostensibly demonstrate that capability. By
pointing to these facts repeatedly, the Jacobson court attempts to provide
44. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 126 S.W.3d 377, 380, 382, 385 (Mo. 2004) (en
bane); State v. Fortner, 451 S.W.3d 746, 758 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) ( " A car can be a
dangerous instrument when used in circumstances where it is readily c11pablc of c11using death or serious injury.'').
45. Jacobso11, 526 S.W.3d at 234 ("Contrary to Jacobson's argument on appeal.
it is not the mere fact tliat he was involved in an accident while operating a vehicle
while intoxicated thnt supports his conviction for anncd criminal action hut the operation of that vehicle. while intoxicated. in adclitio11 to the extensive attendant circumstances. explained above. that made his vehicle readily capable o f causing death or
serious physical injury."); see u/so id. ("We reach our decision based upon the unusual facts o f this case.").
46. Williams, 126 S.W.3d at 384 ("Missouri courts have repeatedly held that a
seemingly innocuous item may constitute a dangerous instrument by considering the
circumstances under which the object is used. In these cases, the standard for determining whether an ordinary object constituted a dangerous instrument turned on

whether tire defendant J..71owing(v used the object in a ma1111er in which it wus readi(v
capable o f ca11si11g death or serious physical injury." (emphasis added)). We deal
with this point in greater detail in the next Section.
47. The requirement o f "knowledge" is a lesser requirement than that o f "purpose." As the Jacobson court wrote, "l11e State need not prove Jacobson subjectively
intended 10 cause death or physical injury through the use o f his vehicle, but that he
'knowingly used [his] vehicle in a manner or under circumstances in which it was
readily capable o f causing death or serious physical injury."' Jacobson, 526 S. W.3d
at 234 (alteration in original) (quoting Fortner, 451 S.W.Jd at 758).
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some limits to its holding.48 Cars are not always dangerous instruments, but
here, when used in this way and in these circumstances, they are. But the
Jacobson court's appearance o f providing a reasoned limiting principle is
almost wholly illusory.
Consider that even i f we take away some or all o f the facts, one by one,
from Jacobson, it still is the case that the driver should know that the car is a
dangerous instrument, that is, readily capable o f causing serious physical
injury or death. A person driving drunk should know that driving intoxicated
makes one a more dangerous driver. A person driving at night should have a
heightened appreciation o f the risks o f driving when lighting is limited. A
person should be on alert when driving in a crowded area - someone could
dart out into the middle o f the road or not be paying attention. Why don't
each o f these, taken in isolation, show that one "knows" that a car is readily
capable o f causing injury or even death? At least the driver was going slow
in Jacobson. A person driving down the expressway at seventy or eighty
miles an hour should know that his or her car as such is capable o f causing
serious physical injury or death ifhe or she is not careful. But a person backing out the driveway also knows that his or her car is readily capable o f causing serious physical injury or death. That, after all, is why one exercises care
in that situation.
The point is that the court in Jacobson was wrong when it emphasized
that it was in those (unique) circumstances that the car became a dangerous
instrument. Cars are always dangerous instruments when they are being operated, i f one means by "dangerous instrument" that they are readily capable
o f causing serious physical injury or death. 49 The fact that the Jacobson
court, following the Supreme Court o f Missouri, added that the defendant
needs to know that cars are readily capable o f causing death or physical injury is a minor constraint, at best. Only in rare circumstances are cars not almost immediately able to cause death or physical injury: when no one is
around, for instance, or when the car is stationary (parked in the garage, with
no driver). In most cases, when one is driving on a highway with other cars
or on a street in a residential area, a car, just by virtue o f what it is, is something that is readily capable o f causing death or physical injury.
Consider a further absurd result that is generated by the Jacobson interpretation o f dangerous instrument. Take the same facts - it is late at night,
the driver is drunk, and he is driving in a congested area. But add two twists.
48. See, e.g., id. at 234 ("The fact that he lied to law enforcement about his activities suggests he was, in fact, aware o f the dangerous nature o f his conduct.").
49. As the United States Supreme Court put it in a different context, "Motor
vehicles arc dangerous machines, and, even when skillfully and carefully operalcd,
their use is attended by serious dangers to persons and property." Hess v. Pawloski,
274 U.S. 352, 356 ( 1927); see also Hilyer v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., No.
2:09-cv-00843-JHH, 2011 WL 925027, at *14 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 31, 2011) ("Given
that driving a car is a dangerous activity that requires the utmost focus, Plaintiff's
choice to get behind the wheel belies her assertion that the pain medication inhibits
her ability to function, especially wilh respect to driving.").
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First, he does not hit anybody. Second, he is actually on his way to a friend's
house to give him a check that, it turns out, is forged. The car, by the reasoning o f Jacobson, is still a dangerous instrument. rt is still readily capable o f
causing serious physical injury - one does not actually have to hurt someone
with an object for that object to be a dangerous weapon, although actually
killing or causing someone serious physical injury is good proof that the item
was capable o f so doing. So the car is a dangerous instrument. The felony, in
this case, is the forgery o f the check.so and because the driver used a dangerous weapon to aid in the commission o f the felony (driving to the friend's
house), this is sufficient for an ACA conviction as well. We think that this
gives a reductio ad absurdum o f treating cars as dangerous instruments. So
long as we assume that the driver knew his car was capable o f causing serious
physical injury or death (which, as we have suggested, almost everybody
does in almost all circumstances) - and so long as the car was being used to
help commit a felony, an ACA conviction should be practically automatic.
This cannot be the real intent o f the drafters o f the legislation, no matter how
broad a reading we assume that they did intend.st
Note what is happening in this analysis o f cars as dangerous instruments. The analysis basically makes cars into the equivalent o f deadly weapons by not being able to effectively limit the circumstances in which cars can
be "readily capable" o f causing serious harms. Recall deadly weapons are
presumed, always and everywhere, as being capable o f causing harm - that is
why we do not really care about the odd case where a gun is unloaded; in
those cases, the presumption o f harm trumps the temporarily non-dangerous
nature o f the unloaded gun. But the plain meaning o f the statutes suggests
that dangerous instruments are supposed to be different. There, the definition
covers objects that could be different things in different contexts - ordinary
objects that become dangerous because o f the way they are used.52 A pen, for
example, may not ordinarily be readily capable o f causing harm, but it could
be if it were placed under one's neck in a threatening manner. 53
50. A class D felony in Missouri. Mo. REv. STAT. § 570.090 (Cum. Supp.
2017). More precisely, it would be the "transfer" of the forged check.
51. See State e.x rel. Bulloch v. Seier, 771 S.W.2d 71, 76 (Mo. 1989) (en bane)
(Blackmar, J., concurring), overn,led en ba11c by State v. Blackman, 968 S.W.2d 138
(Mo. 1998) (per curiam).
52. "Unlike a deadly weapon, a dangerous instrument is not designed for use as a
weapon and may have a nonnal function under ordinary circumstances." State v.
Rousselo, 386 S.W.3d 919, 923-24 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting State v. Williams,
126 S.W.3d 377,384 (Mo. 2004) (en bane)).
53. In Arnold, the court stated:
In this context, given the soft tissue vulnerabilities of the neck and throat, the
jury could have reasonably inferred that the pen was, in fact, capable of causing serious injury and death when the sharp point of that pen was pushed
forcefully to that area of Officer Fields' neck, just as the Defendant threatened
that it could. Defendant believed the pen was capable of killing Officer
Fields, because he intended that Reynolds actually use it to kill her. Thus, the
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Cars, though, seem to be always and eve,ywhere dangerous; that is just
how they are.54 One could be going slow and hit someone, seriously injuring
him; one could be going fast, and driving more or less carefully and still hit
someone, killing him. Cars are ordinary objects that seem to be more or less
always dangerous - readily capable o f causing serious harm - at least under
the court's jurisprudence. No Missouri court, as o f yet, has said as much,
even though the logic o f its jurisprudence seems to lead it to that conclusion,
and the Jacobson court went out o f its way to emphasize that it was not saying that cars are always dangerous instruments. But the various courts who
have found cars to be dangerous instruments have been unconvincing in
showing how, given their interpretation o f the statute, they could exclude cars
- again, in all but the rarest o f circumstances - from being what deadly
weapons are: intrinsically or inherently dangerous items.
B. lee Picks
Our second case is based on the facts in S1a1e v. Baumann, where a person used a folding knife, rather than an ice pick, to slash the tires on a former
employer's car.H The facts work better, initially, ifwe use an ice pick, rather
than a knife, to remove any initial inference that the knife could somehow fit
under "deadly weapon" because it is close enough to a dagger or a switchblade knife. Slashing tires amounts to tampering with a vehicle, which is a
felony.s 6 And if an ice pick/knife counts as a dangerous instrument, then an
ACA charge could also be added - as it was in Baumann. The question in the
Baumann case was, under the circumstances, could an ice pick, or a folding
knife, be considered a dangerous instrument? If it were a dagger that Baumann used, the case would be an easy one because daggers are deadly weapons and merely using a deadly weapon during the commission o f a felony is
enough for an ACA conviction. But here the court had to engage in the further inquiries o f I) whether the object could harm someone in the circumstances and 2) whether he (Baumann) knew that. As the court explained,
citing precedent, "[T)he standard for determining whether an ordinary object
constitute[s] a dangerous instrument turn[s] on whether the defendant know-

threat of using the pen to harm her under those circumstances transfonncd it
into a dangerous instrument.
State v. Arnold, 216 S.W.3d 203, 208-09 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).
54. Again, this makes them more like deadly weapons, which are - in the terms
we used - inherently dangerous. Deadly weapons can always cause harm (even if a
switchblade knife was designed as a piece o f art, it can still cause harm, which is the
important thing, not what the purpose o f the designer was). More to the point, the
fact o f the deadly weapon's abi!ily to cause harm still makes a deadly weapon, even
in a context where it cannot cause harm - an unloaded gun, for instance.
55. State v. Baumann, 217 S.WJd 914, 916-17, 919 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).
56. Mo. REV. STAT.§ 569.080.1(2) (Cum. Supp. 2017).
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ingly used the object in a manner in which it was readily capable o f causing
death or serious physical injury."S7
The defendant, in this case, argued that what he used to slash the tires
could not have been a dangerous instrument because he did not intend to use
the knife in a way that would cause anyone serious physical harm or death. 58
But this is not quite the test, as the Missouri courts have articulated it. The
test is not whether a person intends to use an ordinary object as a dangerous
instrument - "purpose" is not a part o f the definition o f "dangerous instrument'' (although w e will argue below that it probably should be read to include it). Rather, as the Missouri courts have outlined the test for a dangerous instrument, the only requirement is that the person be aware o f - or
"know" - the object's nature as a dangerous instrument, that is, the defendant
has to be aware that he or she has an object that is readily capable o f causing
harm in the circumstances, not that she intends to use the object as a dangerous instrument.59 The fact that Baumann was not using the object to threaten
someone, but rather to slash the tires o f a car, is not entirely to the point. The
questions under Missouri precedent are, again, 1) whether the knife in those
circumstances was objectively "readily capable o f causing death or other
serious physical injury" and 2) whether the defendant /mew that.60
Surprisingly, the court found in Baumann that the knife was not a dangerous instrument, despite the obvious objective characteristics o f a knife knives can be used to cut people as well as to slash tires, and w e might think:
if a car is almost always a dangerous instrument, as w e concluded above, then
why not a knife? 6 1 Moreover, to rebut once more the defendant's argument,
under Missouri precedent knives are not made dangerous (that is, readily
capable o f causing harm) depending on the i11te11tion o f the user o f the knife.
If one is holding a knife, it would seem that one is holding a dangerous instrument, no matter what the circumstances. That is why people are, or at
least should be, very careful when carrying knives! A person's intention does
not make the knife more or less dangerous i11tri11sica/ly. As one lower court
put it, there is no language in the statute
that requires a subjective intent of the defendant to use the object with
an intent to cause death or serious physical injury. In fact, this requirement is contrary to the legislature's objective standard in the stat

57. Barmrann, 217 S.W.3d at 918.
58. Appellant argued "under the circumstances of this particular case that there
was never a showing (that he used the knife] with an intent [to cause] death or bodily
harm." Id. (alterations in original). He maintained that the "mental state of knowingly or intentionally using the instrument to cause death or bodily hann is required to
convert it from an innocent article to a dangerous instrument." Id.
59.

Id.

60. Id.; Mo. REV. STAT.§ 556.061.20 (Cum. Supp. 2017).
61. B,111mam1, 217 S.W.3d at 919.
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ute, apparent from its use o f the language "readily capable o f causing
death or serious physical injury. "62
How then, did the court find that, given the circumstances in the case, a knife
was not a dangerous instrument, given the "objective" fact that knives can cut
people and hurt them?
The court's answer to this was, because there were 110 people arotmd. 63
In circumstances where one is using a knife, even using a knife to cut something, and no one is around to cut or to kill, the knife is not a dangerous instrument, the court concluded. In those circumstances, the knife is not readi{v capable o f causing hann because one would have to go find someone (or
someone would have to come near) to make the knife a dangerous instrument. 64 The standard is still an objective one and not dependent on the intention o f the person using the knife because it is a function o f the circumstances
that the knife is or is not dangerous, not on whether the person is intending to
use the weapon in a dangerous way. While the court in Baumann acknowledged that the statute does not have a requirement that a person be present in
order for an object to become a dangerous instrument, it did seem to draw the
implication that applying the statute has just such a requirement. "[T]he key
consideration in detennining whether an object is a dangerous instrument,"
the court concluded, "is whether it can kill or seriously injure 'under the circumstances in which it is used,' [g]iven the particular facts at issue there was
but a remote possibility that any other individual could have been injured by
Appellant's use o f the dangerous instrument."65
This conclusion fits with our analysis above, which after all, did agree
that a car is not always a dangerous instrument - not when one is driving on
an empty and open street, or when a car is off and inside a garage. Things
change when one is driving on a highway with other cars or in an area where
there arc pedestrians whom one could hit or kill - which is to say, most o f the
time when people arc driving their cars they are dangerous instruments (and
people know that). Knives, under the Baumann analysis, are not always dangerous instruments. For example, when no one is around and one is slashing
the tires on a car with a knife or an ice pick, one is not using a dangerous
instrument, rather, one is using an ordinary object - even in the circumstances
possibly a "seemingly innocuous" one.66 Again, one has to take the knife
closer to someone, or a person has to come closer to the individual committing the felony. As the court noted in Ba11ma1111, no one was around against
whom the knife could have been used.
62. Slate v. Williams, No. WD 60855, 2003 WL I906460, al • 11 (Mo. Ct. App.
2003) (emphasis added), lra11sjerred en bane lo 126 S.W.3d 377 (Mo. 2004).
63. Bauma1111, 217 S.WJd at 919.
64. See id. al 918-19.
65. Id. al 919 (citation omiucd) (quoting Slate v. Eoff, 193 S.W. 366, 374 (Mo.
Ct App. 2006)).
66. Id. at 918.
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Is this a plausible result? The language o f the Baumann court is illuminating in this regard. The court wrote that there was only a "remote possibility"67 that any other individual could have been injured by Baumann's use o f
the knife in slashing the tire. The idea here, presumably, is that a remote
possibility o f injury is not enough to make the knife into an object that is in
fact readily capable o f causing someone injury. There was no one around
against whom the knife could "readily" be used to cause harm - in this regard, it was like having a slingshot with no rocks around. But suppose someone was around, close by, watching. Suppose it was a co-conspirator who
was ready to spell Baumann when his arm got tired from slashing. Would
that change the knife into a dangerous instrument? 68 It should, supposing we
keep with the same objective analysis that the Missouri courts have favored.
Now that someone is close by, the knife could readily cause that other person
injury. It is a knife, and a knife that can cut a tire could cut another person,
causing him or her "serious physical injury." It should not matter that the
other person is in on the tire-slashing with him because that would covertly
add an element o f intent or purpose into an analysis: Baumann would not
want to cut a person who was helping him, that would not be his intent. But
objectively speaking, if a person comes close, even i f it is a person he does
not know, or better, knows and has no intention o f harming, the knife is now
suddenly transformed into a dangerous instrument. All that should matter is
that there is a person present because presence creates a possibility o f harm. 69
We should forestall one objection here, although we will have to return
to it shortly. Whether one is using a dangerous instrument intentionally is
surely relevant to whether an object is a dangerous instrument - for example,
threatening to kill someone with a knife. None o f the courts disagree with
67. Id. at 919.
68. We might also ask, what about the risk ofBaunumn hurting himself!
69. This point was recently demonstrated in the case of State ,,. Brittain, where
the fact that a person was "within 12 feet" of someone holding a metal pipe was sufficient - along with some threatening remarks - to show that the pipe was a "dangerous
instrument.'' State v. Brittain, 539 S.W.3d 925, 927, 930 (Mo. Ct. App.) (man who
beat a person's car with a "four-foot metal pipe" found guilty o f first degree property
damage and Anned Criminal Action because " i f Victim had stayed put or tried to
prevent the damage to the Chevrolet, Defendant co11/d /rave 11sed the metal pipe on
Victim in a manner readily capable of causing serious physical injury or even death"
(emphasis added)), transfer denied (Mo. Mar. I, 2018); see also id. at 929 ("(I]t is a
reasonable inference that Defendant 111011/d have used the pipe on Victim i f he had
remained." (emphasis added)). Note how hypothetical, even counter-factual the reasoning is - i f the victim had stayed tire pipe would have been used. In fact, the person
Brittain confronted ran away almost immediately, and Brittian only used the pipe to
damage property (a truck). Id. (owner of the truck testifying that "[t]hey started beating my truck because they co1tld11 't come after me." (alteration in original) (emphasis
added)). It is not too much to speculate that under this reasoning, Ba11ma1111 really
should have come out the other way, because i f someone had come up to Baumann
when he was slashing the car's tires, he could have used the pick to cause serious
physical injury or death.
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this.70 Yet the car cases and the knife cases are important because they show
that the statutory definition o f a dangerous instrument - as the courts have
interpreted it - does not require this element. They only require that one
knows that one is dealing with a dangerous instrument and that in the circumstances in which the object is used, the object is, in fact, a dangerous instrument. One may know one has an object that, in the circumstances, is readily
capable o f causing harm to another person without it being the case that one
illfends to harm anyone with that object, and the courts have insisted on this
distinction in cases where that intention to harm is absent. 71
The upshot, to emphasize, is that (most) knives under this analysis come
very close to being deadly weapons - they arc those things that are, in most
every circumstance, readily capable o f causing serious physical harm or
death. This may not be too surprising. Regular, ordinary knives are very
nearly (and in some cases, the exact same as) daggers or switch-blade knives
- objects that are on the list o f "deadly weapons" in the Missouri statute.
Plain, ordinary knives, in other words, are objects that are close to being intrinsically harmful (as are deadly weapons). Yet the same thing is true o f
almost anything with a point on it that is sharp - like an ice pick. These are
things that will, i f a person is around, be capable o f causing real and sometimes serious harm to that person. All that is required is that the person
knows that the object is capable o f causing that harm, which in nearly every
case will be true.

C. Fists
We now arrive at our final example, which can be simply described: a
man beats a person with his fists so that the person suffers a serious injury some sort o f permanent impairment. Has the man used his "fists" as a deadly
weapon? It seems clear, especially in the case where it was the intention o f
someone to cause serious physical injury, that the fists, in this case, were
certainly readily capable o f causing such injury: in a case called Evans, they
clearly did.72 But the court in Evans, after a lengthy and impressive analysis
by the judge, concluded that fists could not be dangerous instruments under
the ACA statute because they were not "instruments" at all.73 They could not
fit under the statute because the statute required - i f it was read according to
70. See Brittain, 539 S.W.3d at 930; Baumann, 217 S.W.3d at 918; State v. Williams, 126 S.W.3d 377,384 (Mo. 2004) (en bane).
71. Williams, 126 S.W.3d at 384 ("The statutory definition of 'dangerous instrument' in section [556.061(20)), requires only that the defendant knows he is using
the instrument under circumstances that arc 'readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury' and docs not require that the defendant have the subjective intent
to use the object with an intent to cause death or serious physical injury."); see also
Ba11111a1111, 217 S.W.3d at 918-19 (circumstances indicated defendant did not have an
intent to harm a person; conviction for Armed Criminal Action reversed).
72. State v. Evans, 455 S.W.3d 452,460 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014).
73. Id. at 458-61.
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its ordinary meaning - that a person use something separate from him or
herself to cause the damage, and a body part was not (or not sufficiently}
separate. We do not speak, the court reasoned, o f a person's hands as an "instrument, article, or substance." Moreover, the court went on, the purpose o f
the ACA statute is to "impose greater punishment on those individuals who
choose to use an item or weapon to commit a crime than those who do not." 74
Because a hand is not a separate thing one uses to commit a crime - as the
opinion also notes, it is not as if one could be armed with his or her "fists" body parts cannot be dangerous instmments under the statute, however dangerous they might be. If dangerous instruments are meant to be given a broad
definition, the definition at least has some limits.
Still, it is not obvious that the court in Evans is right, despite its erudition. At least one other Missouri court found that "elbows" could be used as
instruments. 75 The court's analysis in the Burclt "elbows" case is rather
sparse, but one can see how the court may have reached its decision. In ordinary circumstances, an elbow is just a body part - not especially dangerous.
One can, however, wield one's elbow and use it in a way that it can be quite
harmful. This is the same as with other, ordinary objects. A belt is not usually dangerous, but it can be used in a dangerous way. And so too with one's
hands - ordinarily they are just hands. But when bundled up to make a fist,
they can be very harmful, especially when used to cause harm. As the court
described in Burch, "The repeated striking [of the elbow] caused bleeding,
swelling and bruising to [the victim's] head and neck."16 In dicta, the Burch
court extended this reasoning to fists: "[f]ists can be a force likely to produce
death or great bodily harm within the meaning o f the statute defining assault
in the first degree."71
O f course, the fact that something can cause serious physical injury or
death docs not transform it into a dangerous instrument - and indeed, this is
where the Evans court lays the most emphasis. As an earlier court wrote in
Seiter, "Although it is true an assault with fists may be a force likely to produce death or great bodily harm . . . this is not the same as classifying hands
as dangerous instruments or deadly weapons . . . . " 78 Fists can be deadly, but
they are still not instruments. But was Evans right on this point? It is, after
all, not entirely odd to speak o f using one's fists as an instrument o f another's
demise - even if the use here verges on the metaphorical. Other Missouri
courts have not hesitated to find that boots can be categorized as dangerous
instruments when used to stomp on someone, even when there was no indication that the boots had steel toes or were reinforccd.79 Indeed, one court

ted).

74. Id. at 459. The language o f choice here is illuminating.
75. State v. Burch, 939 S.W.2d 525, 530 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
76. Id.
77. Id. (citing State v. Wheadon, 779 S.W.2d 708, 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)).
78. Seiter v. State, 719 S.W.2d 141, 143-44 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (citation omit-

19. See State v. Taylor, 645 S.W.2d 199, 202 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (cowboy boot is a dangerous instrument); see also State v. Johnson, 182 S.W.Jd 667, 671
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found leather-soled shoes to be a dangerous instrument.80 Would a leather
glove transfonn a fist into a deadly weapon merely because it added something in addition to a body part? Couldn't one's feet by themselves be deadly
weapons? It does not seem especially odd to think o f elbows (as opposed to
fists) as instruments, and o f using them as instruments. The Evans court's
reasoning would also license the result that although one's actual hands cannot be dangerous instruments, a prosthetic hand might, in fact, be because it
is "something more than his or her own body." 8 1
And although w e cannot infer that something is an instrument from the
fact that it caused serious hann, the motivation behind this inference is not
entirely wrong. 82 If the goal behind various dangerous instrument statutes is
to deter crimes that involve a heightened risk o f hann in the circumstances,
then certainly a fist is more dangerous than, say, an open hand or a pointed
finger. At least one state court, in Alaska, runs its analysis in precisely this
way. In one decision, it held that the state could prove a fist was a dangerous
instrument by showing that there was "particularized evidence from which
reasonable jurors could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the manner
in which the hand was used . . . posed an actual and substantial risk o f causing death or serious physical injury, rather than a risk that was merely hypothetical or abstract." 83 Such a broad reading o f the statute in light o f the purpose to deter people who commit felonies in an especially dangerous way
does not seem prima facie implausible. It gets beyond the fonnalism o f requiring that there be some extra (and detached or separable) object that causes
the harm, rather than focusing on the real risk o f harm in the circumstances.
It is not, after all, always the case that one can inflict more harm with an object in one's hand than with one's fists alone.
Finally, how docs Evans tit with the Missouri courts' other cases that
have held cars are "instruments"? It docs not exactly correspond to our ordinary way o f speaking to view a car as an instrument - except again, in the
metaphorical way in which it makes sense also to speak o f fists as "instru-

(Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (using boots lo stomp or kick "would meet
the dangerous instrument requirement to support a conviction for armed criminal
action").
80. State v. Brinkley, 193 S.W.2d 49, 53 (Mo. 1946).
81. State v. Evans, 455 S.W.3d 452, 459 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014). As an Arizona
stale court held, '"[W]e conclude that although a prosthetic device is designed to be
used as a substitute for a body part, such a device is 1101 a ·body part' within the
meaning of[lhc state's ACA statute and subsequent casclaw]." State v. Schaffer, 48
P.3d 1202, 1206 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002).
82. It is a commonplace o f statutory interpretation that when a statute is capable
o f more than one inlerprelalion, courts can refer to the underlying purpose o f lhe
slatutc and look beyond the "plain and ordinary meaning" o f lhc statute. State ex rel.
Md. Heights Fire Prot. Dist. v. Campbell, 736 S.W.2d 383,387 (Mo. 1987) (en bane).
83. Konrad v. Slate, 763 P.2d 1369, 13 74 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
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ments. " 84 And, to again echo the Evans court, it seems strange to speak o f
being "anned" with a car. Nor are cars (like fists) really "articles" or "substances." I f fists are to be rejected because they cannot be instruments, then
so too could cars be rejected - despite the obvious capability o f both cars and
fists to cause serious harm and even death. 85 A Missouri court similarly rejected taking "fire" to be an instrument or a substance when looked at in light
o f "everyday language" alone.86 I f it is possible that cars or fire could be
instruments, despite our ordinary use o f the word "instrument," then it seems
at least as possible that fists could be. The point is not that it is obvious that
fists must be considered instruments, only that it is not obvious that they must
not be considered instruments.81 As we shall see in the next Part, we think
that there is a stronger argument for excluding fists from being instruments not based on the meaning of the word "instrument" but rather on the illfent
with which one is using one's fists.

IV. INSTRUMENTS AND INTENTIONS
The previous Part served two major purposes. The first was to show
how current interpretations o f . dangerous instrument" have led Missouri
courts into various dead ends or at least bizarre and strange conclusions. Cars
are dangerous instruments in most every circumstance. 88 Things with sharp
blades, i f they are not daggers or switchblade knives, are dangerous instruments but only i f someone is close by. 89 Fists are not dangerous instruments,
but boots are, and elbows might be.90 The second, broader, purpose o f the

84. It is an instrument in the narrow sense that a car is separate from one's body
- but that would make everything apart from one's body an i11str11ment, which also
seems odd.
85. In other words, it seems hard to thread the needle between holding that fists
are not instruments and that cars are.
86. State v. ldlebird, 896 S.W.2d 656, 663 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995), ovem,led en
bane by State v. Williams, 126 S.W.3d 377 (Mo. 2004). The court went on to hold
that fire could be a dangerous instrument under the statute if it were used with the
intent lo cause harm. Id. at 665.
87. A point made in State v. Johnson in finding that it was not necessarily error
for a prosecutor in closing arguments to remark, "[H]e did it with a dangerous instrument, his hands and his feet." State v. Johnson, 182 S.W.3d 667, 670-71 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2005).
88. See. e.g., Williams, 126 S.W.3d at 384-85; State v. lse, 460 S.W.3d 448,456
(Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (evidence sufficient to find motor vehicle driven as dangerous
weapon).
89. See, e.g.• State v. Jackson, 865 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (knife
held against victim's throat in threatening manner is dangerous instrument); State v.
Hyman, 11 S.WJd 838, 841 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (same); State v. Baumann, 217
S.WJd 914, 919 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (knife used to slash tires not a dangerous instrument because no one present at time offense commilled).
90. See State v. Evans, 455 S.WJd 452, 460-61 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (fists not
dangerous instruments despite causing serious physical injury to victim); State v.
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last Part was to show the contours o f Missouri's jurisprudence surrounding
The court tries to restrict the seemingly limitless
dangerous instruments.
range o f dangerous instruments (remember that most ordinary objects i11 some
circumstances can cause someone harm) by focusing on the current circumstances and the actual use o f the object in those circumstances. But we have
seen that this is not that great o f a constraint. It will constrain the ice pick or
knife from being dangerous when no one is around, but this change when
someone is no longer "remote." It is even harder to specify when cars are not
readily capable o f causing serious harm to someone. Courts have further
stated that the person must know that the object is capable o f causing harm.91
But who does not know this about a car, or a knife, or an ice pick? Again, the
purported constraint does not really constrain.
In this Part, we begin to chart a different, and we think better, course.
First, we make clear that the court's jurisprudence on dangerous instruments
is not bad just because it leads to some questionable results - it may be that
most statutes have this implication to some extent. The problems seem to us,
deeper. The current method for interpreting "dangerous instruments" threatens to obscure the distinction between deadly weapons and dangerous instruments by implying that there are some dangerous instruments that are in
fact intrinsically harmful - which is what deadly weapons are supposed to be.
In other words, it turns out that under the current interpretation o f "dangerous
instruments" there will be some things that are always and everywhere dangerous, no matter how carefully they are used, or with what intent. A t the
very least, there remains considerable ambiguity under the court's current
jurisprudence over what exactly the category o f "dangerous instruments"
includes - and this is a problem o f vagueness. A term is vague when it is no
longer clear what is, exactly, the reach o f the statute - when its boundaries
become excessively fuzzy, and no one knows, precisely, what conduct falls
under the statute.92 Such is the case, we believe, with "dangerous instruments" under current Missouri law.
Burch, 939 S.W.2d 525, 530 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (elbow qualifies as dangerous inslrument); Johnso11, 182 S.W.3d at 672 (jury had sufficienl evidence to conclude
boots were dangerous instruments); State v. Taylor, 645 S.W.2d 199, 202 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1982) (cowboy boot is dangerous instrument).
91. The canonical stalement oflhe slandard is in State v. Williams: "[t]he statulory detinilion of 'dangerous instrument' in section [556.061(20)] requires only that the
defendant knows he is using the instrument under circumstances that are 'readily
capable of causing death or serious physical injury."' Williams, 126 S. W.3d at 384.
92. See, e.g., Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 892 (2017) ("This Court
has held that lhe Due Process Clause prohibits the Government from taking away
someone's life, liberty, or property under a criminal law so vague that it fails to give
ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites
arbitrary enforcement. Applying this standard, the Court has invalidated two kinds of
criminal laws as void for vagueness: laws that defi11e criminal offenses and laws that
fi:r the permissible se11te11ces for criminal offenses. For the fonner, the Court has
explained that the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what
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We think that there is a solution to these problems, but it requires going
back to some cases that the Supreme Court o f Missouri has recently and
wrongly ovenuled. Those cases, Pogue and ldlebird, focused on the fact that
what makes a dangerous object dangerous is when one intends to use that
object to cause harm.93 This is not a perversion o f the statute, by any means,
which the Supreme Court o f Missouri in Williams alleged. Rather, it is to
point out that the most salient circumstance in deciding whether something is
dangerous is the i11te11t with which someone is using that object. If one has
the purpose o f causing harm with an ice pick, then that ice pick is readily
capable o f causing physical harm; indeed, it is the intention that (ultimately)
makes it capable in this way. 94 An ice pick is relatively innocuous when it is
used merely to pick at ice. What is more, adding a requirement o f purpose
solves the vagueness problem. If the state has to show that one really intended to use an object to cause harm, one can hardly complain about not having
"fair warning" that one could be punished for using an object that could cause
serious harm or death. In the final Section o f this Part, we chart a course for
Missouri courts to bring back the dangerous instrument statute - and by extension, the ACA statute - into line with this understanding.
A. Dead(v Weapons and Dangerous Instruments, Again
Let us return to the distinction between deadly weapons and dangerous
instruments. For starters, the deadly weapons statute is a list; the dangerous
instruments statute is more a description o f some particular objects. The
deadly weapons statute is therefore rather easy to apply - at least in most
conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted)).
93. State v. Idlebird, 896 S.W.2d 656, 664 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (asserting the
key issue for detennining whether something is a dangerous instrument is whether
circumstances demonstrate an intent and motive to cause death or serious
hann), overn1led e11 bane b y Williams, 126 S.W.3d 377; State v. Pogue, 851 S.W.2d
702, 706 (holding motor vehicle not a dangerous instrument because it was not used
with intent to cause hann), overruled e11 bane by Williams, 126 S.W.3d 377.
94. As one state court did in dealing with an ice pick:
While an ice pick is not a weapon in the strict sense of the word and is not
"dangerous or deadly" to others in the ordinary use for which it is designed
and therefore may not be said as a matter of law to be a "dangerous or deadly
weapon," nevertheless when it appears that sue!, i11stntmentality is capable o f

being used i11 a "dangerous or dead(v" manner. and it may befairl,v inferred
from the e1•ide11ce tlrat its possessor i11le11ded 011 a particular occasio11 to use ii
as a weapon, should tire circ11mslances require, ils c/1aracler as a "da11gero11s
or deadl,v 111eapo11 "may be tlrus established, at least/or the purpose o f the occ:asio11.

People v. Klimek, 341 P.2d 722, 725-26 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (emphasis added)
(citing People v. Raleigh, I6 P.2d 752 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1932)).
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cases. Was the item used in the crime on the list o f deadly weapons? If it
was, or if it was something close enough, then the item is a deadly weapon;
there is really no further inquiry- except perhaps the question o f whether one
knew one had a deadly weapon, which again should be easy enough to satisfy.95 One only needs to know, for example, that one was holding a gun. But
with dangerous instruments, the inquir y is considerably more complex. We
have to ask whether, in this particular circumstance, the object was readily
capable o f causing serious physical injury or death. Here we cannot just put
together a list o f objects, or so it would seem. We would have to see how the
object is being used in those circumstances to detennine whether it was really
dangerous or whether it was, instead, an "innocuous" object. 96
The contrast between the two, as articulated in Part II, seems to be that
deadly weapons are inherently or intrinsically dangerous - we do not want
people carrying them or using them, period - and dangerous instruments are
not, or not necessarily. That is why i f a deadly weapon is used at all in the
commission o f a crime, that is enough to get an ACA charge and likely conviction. The statute reflects the policy detennination that deadly weapons are
always bad to have.
Not so with dangerous instruments. In many cases, they involve objects
that are usually good or usefitl (shoes, champagne bottles, boots). That is
why it is an essential part o f a dangerous instrument that it actually be closely
related to the possibility o f hurting someone, not just that one has the object
at hand. More precisely, the object has to be "under the circumstances"
"readily capable" o f causing a person hann. 97 Some situations will involve
an object that is potentially a dangerous instrument but is not one because the
circumstances do not make it so (a knife or an ice pick when no one is
around, for example). That is why we have to look closely at the circumstances to see what the object was, in fact, capable o f doing - it is not enough
just to say that the object had the potential to be dangerous. We have to show
that in the circumstances it was in fact dangerous.
But then we are faced with the court's current jurisprudence, where
some things do in fact seem immune to the circumstances because they are
always or at least usually dangerous. So some things become de facto deadly
weapons because they take on the intrinsic or inherently harmful nature o f
deadly weapons. Cars really do seem to be ordinary objects that are always
readily capable o f causing serious hann or death. Knives o f all sorts (and ice
picks) are as well. If the analysis is truly one that is objective and looks at the
circumstances and (at most) one's knowledge o f the ready capability o f the
95. There is some question whether the deadly weapon inquiry really requires
this much - or i f it is only enough that one had a deadly weapon and used it in the
commission of the crime. If so, this would make the deadly weapon inquiry that
much more objective than the one regarding dangerous instruments, where Missouri
courts have been explicit that one must at least know that one has an object that is
readily capable of causing serious physical harm or death.
96. See State v. Evans, 455 S.W.3d 452,457 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014).
97. MO. REV. STAT.§ 556.061(20) (Cum. Supp. 2017).
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object to cause harm, then an object can be dangerous even i f it is the furthest
thi11gfrom 011e's mind to use it to cause harm.
It is possible that we could just accept this conclusion. There is an easy
rejoinder, however: if some objects are always dangerous, why were these
objects not simply included on the list o f deadly weapons? This has some
force when it comes to knives, because (perhaps oddly) only some kinds o f
knives were included on the list o f deadly weapons - and some courts have
pushed "daggers" to include most knives. But this only enables us to see the
distinction between the deadly weapons and dangerous instruments more
clearly. The intention behind the distinction must be that the legislature did
not want all knives to be considered as always dangerous. Just having a knife
when one is committing a felony does not make that knife dangerous. We
need to pay attention to see when the knife is in fact readily capable o f causing harm - not resting merely on the fact that something is a knife. Nor can
we rest on the fact that someone was driving a car to conclude that a car is a
dangerous instrument. We need to find something in addition that makes the
knife, or the car, in the circumstances dangerous.
It is the court's approach to the circumstances where we think it has taken a problematic tum. It has tried to limit these circumstances using mostly
objective rather than subjective criteria. As the lower court wrote in the Williams case, the legislature in its view has adopted an "objective standard."98
So we look to whether the car was driven in a heavily populated area or at
night, or when the driver was drunk, as in the Jacobson case. 99 Or we look to
see whether someone is around the person who is slashing the car tires, as in
the Baumann case.ioo We do not look to whether the driver wanted to run
someone over, nor do we look to whether someone wanted to cut a person or
just a tire. We look to see whether, in light o f the objective circumstances,
the object itself could be "readily capable" o f causing hann, quite independent o f the intent o f the person using the object. O f course, intent can be relevant - and in many cases, it will be - but the point is it is not required by the
objective analysis. It is enough if, in the given circumstances, someone could
have been banned by the object. That is what makes an object dangerous or
not. But if we take this seriously, it is hard - as w e endeavored to show - to
see in what circumstances cars would not be rather dangerous, or most knives
for that matter. If a person is close by, he or she could be hit and killed by a
car, or cut by a knife and seriously injured. Nor will it do to emphasize that
the object must be "readily capable" o f causing physical injury. The car cases
do not help us with this, as they seem to allow the possibility that merely
driving badly in a heavily populated area makes a car a dangerous instrument.
Baumann again simply looks at whether someone is nearby - if a person is

98. State v. Williams, No. WD 60855, 2003 WL I906460, at * 11 (Mo. Ct. App.
2003), transferred e11 bane 1 0 126 S.W.3d 377 (Mo. 2004).
99. Slate v. Jacobson, 526 S.W.3d 228,234 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017).
100. Slate v. Baumann, 217 S.W.3d 914,919 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).
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near, then this seems enough to show a knife is readily capable o f causing
injury. IOI
In the cases where a finding o f a dangerous instrument is more plausible, the courts look especially at the intent o f the person using the object which is the approach we endorse. If someone is tl,reate11i11g someone with a
knife, rather than merely holding or using a knife, then it seems that the knife
is ill those circumstances readily capable o f causing harm. 102 It is the agent
and that agent's intentions that create the circumstance that make something an ordinary object - into a dangerous instrument. In addition, this approach
draws much more clearly the line between deadly weapon and dangerous
instrument. If one has a deadly weapon (and one knows it) then one is liable
under the ACA. The list (for the most part) could not be more clear. With a
dangerous instrument, however, the actor must make it into something dangerous - that is, one must by what one i11tends to do transform the object
from something ordinary into something dangerous and harmful. Objective
circumstances may contribute to this analysis, but they should not be decisive. 103 It does matter, o f course, whether the object is sharp or blunt or
heavy - one cannot by one's intentions alone make a pillow into something
that can cause serious hann or death (although perhaps one could use a pillowcase to strangle someone). And there must be someone around who can
be harmed by the object. But beyond these aspects o f dangerousness is what
the purpose o f the user is, and this, we think, should be taken into account.
When w e do this, we can make better sense o f the car cases and the knife
cases than the current court's jurisprudence does and do so in a way that is
arguably consistent with a plain reading o f the statute. 104 A focus on the
agent's intent shows, plausibly, in what circumstances cars really are being
used as weapons - which is not when they arc just being driven, or even recklessly driven. Cars really become weapons when they are being driven purposely at someone. We expand on our positive proposal later in this Section;
101. Id.
102. See State v. Jackson, 865 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). "A knife
used in a threatening maooer is a dangerous instrument." Id. (affirming the conviction o f Armed Criminal Action when the defendant confessed to using a steak knife to
force victim into bedroom, where knife was found). In a similar case, "[tJhe record
show[ed) that [the defendant] look the knife from the victim and then held it to the
victim's throat." Martin v. State, 187 S.W.3d 335, 341 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006). "This
was sufficient to show that he used the knife in a threatening manner, and, therefore,
it constituted a dangerous instrument." Id.
103. It therefore seems incorrect lo say, as did the Missouri Court o f Appeals, that
"[i]t is not important whether the object is in fact capable o f producing harm." State
v. Tankins, 865 S.W.2d 848, 852 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (butter knife with serrated
edge).
104. An older case illustrates how easy the transition from "circumstances o f use"
to "intent" is: "[t)he sufficiency o f the evidence turns not merely upon whether the
knife was itself a deadly weapon. It turns upon the evidence o f how it was used, i.e.,
what appellant i11te11ded when he held it against [victim 'sj stomach." State v. Shannon, 467 S.W.2d 4, 5 (Mo. 1971) (emphasis added).
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for now, we turn to another problem with the court's interpretation o f "dangerous instrument": vagueness.

B. Vagueuess 105
A statute is vague, according to accepted doctrine, if it frustrates the
person o f ordinary intelligence and his or her desire to act according to the
law. 106 That person may want to obey the law, but i f the law is vague he or
she cannot truly know what the law is. If it is against the law to loiter, and
loitering is given a vague definition by statute or by interpretation, the law
will be struck down as void for vagueness. Laws are also vague i f - by the
same token - they give too much discretion to law enforcement officials to
apply the law, and so they may do so arbitrarily. If there is "play" in the statute because it is vague, which gives police, for example, the ability to pick
and choose who disobeys the law, then the law will also be overturned. The
Missouri courts' interpretation o f "dangerous instruments," especially in the
context o f the ACA statute, comes close to making the phrase vague. If ordinary people cannot know when they are using a dangerous instrument (as
opposed to an ordinary object), then certainty police and judges will be free
to, arbitrarily, decide that some things count as dangerous instruments, while
others do not.
Consider how a vagueness objection would apply in the case o f cars.
Are all cars dangerous instruments? We have argued that there is no reason no limiting principle- in the court's interpretation o f "dangerous instrument"
that dictates that some cars are dangerous instruments and others are not. But
no Missouri court has o f yet explicitly stated this rule, and indeed the Jacobson court was keen to maintain that it was 1101 holding that cars, just by virtue
o f being cars, count as dangerous instruments. 107 Then who decides, and how
do we know, which cars are going to be held to be dangerous and which cars
arc merely "innocuous"? The decision in Baumann also raises vagueness
concerns. The knife in that situation was not a dangerous instrument, but
how close would another person have to be in order for the knife to become
"dangerous"'?108 The definition o f "deadly weapon" does not face such
vagueness dangers, at least not to the same degree, as it is reasonably clear
what is meant by a "firearm'' or a "dagger." It is precisely the contextual
105. In State v. Bent:e11, the Missouri Court o f Appeals addressed the issue o f
vagueness as it relates to dangerous instruments, but in only a cursory manner. Stale
v. Bentzen, 646 S.W.2d 802, 803 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (denying defendnnt's contention that a related statute on dangerous instruments was "impennissibly vague").
106. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); see also City o f
Festus v. Werner, 656 S.W.2d 286,287 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) ("Due process requires
that laws provide notice to the ordinary person o f what is prohibited and that such
laws provide law enforcement officials with standards so as to prevent arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement."),
107. See State v. Jacobson, 526 S.W.3d 228,234 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017).
108. See State v. Baumann, 217 S.W.3d 914, 919 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).
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narure o f the dangerous instrument determination, especially as the Missouri
courts have construed it, that makes it so susceptible to a vagueness challenge. It is a dangerous instrument only i f in the circumslaflces it is an object
that is readily capable o f causing serious physical injury or death. But how
are we supposed to tell which circumstances are these?
We can quickly address one objection here, which is that the person who
is guilty o f Armed Criminal Action is already doing something criminal remember that the ACA statute is predicated on committing a felony - so he
or she should already be on notice that his or her conduct is criminal. That is,
the person cannot complain that the starute is unfair or hard to understand
because an ordinary person would already be on notice that what he or she
was doing was criminal and so subject to punishment. What, exactly, can be
the basis o f this complaint? But courts have repeatedly held that notice not
only goes to what conduct is or is not criminal but to fair warning o f the actual co11seq11e11ces that attend a violation o f the criminal law. 109 This, in part, is
why an ex-post facto punishment is wrong 1 10 - in those cases, a person has
already done the criminal wrong, so what grounds for complaint does he or
she have if the punishment suddenly increases? Yet those charged under the
ACA statute do have a basis for complaint, which is that they were not adequately informed that a violation o f this law would carry not only a punishment for the underlying felony but also an additional sanction for committing
a felony with the use o f a dangerous instrument. Indeed, this point may
counsel in favor o f a narrower interpretation o f the ACA statute because the
state is, as it were, piling on. The state has already punished the person for
the predicate crime; now it is just multiplying the penalties - even if it is doing so in a way that does not give rise to double jeopardy concerns. Why
shouldn't the state have to meet a narrower definition o f "dangerous instrument," one which the person who committed the crime had ample and unambiguous notice of!
And in fact, there is a ready way to read the statute so as to cure it o f the
defect o f vagueness, which is to fix it by adding a requirement o f showing
purpose. A Missouri case, Koetting, provides a good example o f this.' 11 In
Koetti11g, a person prosecuted under a harassment starute that made it a crime
to "annoy" people complained that it was overly vague: different people are
annoyed by different things, so how was he to know what was or was not
"annoying"? 112 The court responded that i f this indeed were how the statute
109. See B M W o f N . Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,574 (1996) ("Elementary
notions o f fairness enshrined in [this Court's] constitutional jurisprudence dictate that
a person receive fair notice not only o f the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also o f the severity o f the penalty that a State may impose.").
110. "Critical to relief under the f a Post Ftrcto Clause is not an individual's right
to less punishment, but the lack o f fair notice and governmental restraint when the
legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was
consummated." Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 30 (1981).
111. State v. Koetting, 616 S.W.2d 822, 824-25 (Mo. 1981) (en bane).
112. Id.

h1tps:l/scholilrship.law,missouri.cdu/mlr/volBJ/iss:?/S

32

Flanders and Austin-Holliday: "Dangerous Instruments"': A Case Study in Overcriminalization

2018)

A CASE STUDY IN OVERCRIMINALIZATION

291

was best read, then the defendant was right - "annoy" did not give notice to
the person under the statute and gave too much discretion to law enforcement
officers to prosecute for harassment anyone they felt to be annoying. 113 But
the statute did not merely prohibit annoying speech - it prohibited speech that
was made with the purpose to annoy. This, the court said, gave the person
enough notice. He may not know what annoys some people, but surely he
could know when he was i11tentio11a/ly trying to annoy others. 114 The statute
was not vague because a person o f ordinary understanding could certainly tell
when he had the purpose to annoy, regardless o f whether what he was doing
was actually annoying to others - something that he may not be able to predict.
In the case o f dangerous instruments, we can say that what really makes
a dangerous instrument dangerous is when someone intends to use it to hurt
someone - to cause serious physical injury or death. Not only does this seem
to be a plausible reading o f the statute (as we began to argue in the last Section and will argue in more detail in the next), it does away with any problems o f notice. Maybe a person cannot J...7zow the exact circumstances in
which a car becomes objectively a dangerous instrument, or when a person is
close enough to be harmed by a knife, but he or she can know when he or she
has the purpose o f running someone over with a car or when he or she threatens to cut someone with a knife. There is no problem in finding that the person in those circumstances is guilty o f something worse than the underlying
felony - that by his or her purpose with the object, he or she has made the
situation that much more dangerous (we give an example o f this in the next
Section).
The court has held that purpose is not required, rather something like
knowledge is, but the type o f knowledge that it has required is insufficient to
give fair notice. It only requires that the person knows that an object is readily capable o f causing serious physical injury in the circumstances - not that
the person has the purpose o f causing serious physical injury. That is, the
person only needs to know that a car can kill someone or that a knife can cut
someone. But a person can always be presumed to have this knowledge whether he or she is driving fifty-five miles per hour on the highway or using
a butcher knife to cut some meat. Too much notice is akin to no notice at all
and (again) gives too much discretion to the authorities to decide when this
general knowledge real(v will make the car or the knife a dangerous instru•
ment. Indeed, too much notice - that one is always "on notice" that the ordinary object one is using is a dangerous instrument - is precisely vagueness in
another guise (and marks the point where ovcrbreadth and vagueness meet).
A statute that says one cannot "do bad things" puts one on notice, in a way,
but gives absolutely no guidance to citizens and officials. So too does a statute that prohibits the knowing use o f dangerous instruments when one lacks
any certainty as to when ordinary objects - the car one is driving, the knife
113. /d.

114. ld.
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one is cutting with - will be "transmogrified" (in the words o f one court) 1 15
into a dangerous instrument given the objective, rather than the subjective,
circumstances. 1 16 A requirement o f purposejitl use o f an object to dangerous
ends, however, provides sufficient notice.

C. The Road Not Taken: Requiring a Showing o f Pwpose
The decision to go in a more "objective" dimension - where the subjective intent o f the user o f the object is relevant, but not required, for it to be a
dangerous instrument - was by no means foreordained. Indeed, there was a
split in how the lower Missouri appellate courts were considering what makes
something a dangerous instrument. On one side were those courts that saw it
as necessary to show that a person had the intent to use the "ordinary" object
to cause harm i f one was going to find that the object was a dangerous instrument. 117 It was the person's inte11tio11 in using the object that was the key
to making an "innocuous" ordinary object into one that was "dangerous" under the statute - the most important circumstance when looking at the object
"under the circumstances." Ordinary objects remain ordinary objects if there
is no purpose to use them to cause serious physical injury or death. On the
other side was the position - ultimately endorsed by the Supreme Court o f
Missouri, thus settling the matter• 18 - that the inqui r y was supposed to be
"objective": look at the circumstances, o f which a person's purpose was one
aspect, but not required, for a finding o f dangerousness. The court took
knowledge o f the object's potential for hann to be enough, even if the user o f
the object had no intention to use it as a dangerous instrument. We think the
Supreme Court o f Missouri chose the wrong side in the debate.
One o f the early cases finding subjective intent to be vital in proving
something was a dangerous instrument, Pogue, 119 goes into great length in
articulating the argument for that position. Pogue, like Jacobson (our first
case in the introduction), dealt with the claim that, in the circumstances, a car
had been used as a dangerous instrument. The facts were also somewhat
I 15. State v. Anderson, 663 S.W.2d 412,416 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
116. The A,iderson court stated:
In contrast to a "deadly weapon", a "dangerous instrument" is not designed to
be employed as a weapon and under nonnal use may have a perfectly legitimate function. While a bottle o f gasoline may be innocuous in the ordinary
sense when used for a hannless purpose, it can readily be transmogrified into
a dangerous instrument when employed in a threat to use it as an explosive to
produce physical harm. Defendant's second point is denied.

Id. (citation omitted).
l 17. E.g., State v. Pogue, 851 S.W.2d 702, 706 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993),
bane by State v. Williams, 126 S.W.3d 377 (Mo. 2004).
118. Williams, 126 S.W.3d at 384-85.
119. Pogue, 851 S.W.2d at 705--07.

h11ps://scholarship.law.missouri.c:du/mlr/vola3/iss:?/S

err uled e11

011

Flanders and Austin-Holliday: "Dangerous Instruments"; A Case Study in Overcriminalization

2018]

A CASE STUDY IN OVERCRIMINALIZATION

293

similar. Pogue was intoxicated, he ran a red light, and he collided with another car, killing the driver o f that car.120 He was charged with involuntary
manslaughter and also with Armed Criminal Action - again, with the car as
the dangerous instrument. The state argued that the mere fact that the car was
"readily capable" o f causing serious physical injury or death made it a dangerous instrument.121 This is the position, w e think, that the current court's
jurisprudence leads it to - cars can kill people in most every circumstance,
and so if we do not require that the person meant to use the car in a way that
would cause death or serious physical injury, then w e have no principled
means o f limiting those cases in which cars are 1101 dangerous instruments.
Cars, under this reading, would then simply be things that are inherently dangerous - that is, dangerous in almost every circumstance - and the dangerous
instruments definition would operate in much the same way as the deadly
weapons definition did, i.e., as a list o f items that i f used in conjunction with
a felony leads to guilt under the ACA statute.
The Pogue court refused to go this route and indeed found the state's
reading o f the statute as contrary to the dangerous instrument statute's "plain
or ordinary and usual sense."122 In particular, the state - the Pogue court
argued - was simply reading out o f the statute the plain and ordinary meaning
o f the words "under the circumstances in which it [was) used."123 The state
focused just on the properties o f the objects, rather than the circumstances,
and the court said this approach was too narrow: "[t]he statute requires more
than a showing that an article is readily capable o f causing death or serious
physical injury. It requires more than a showing that the article was the instrument that produced the death o f a person. "124 The statute also requires a
consideration o f the circumstances, and "in determining the circumstances in
which defendant used his automobile at the time in question," the court
wrote, "the user's intent and motive must be considered."125 Here the court
relied on the analysis given by a D.C. court, which bears quoting in full:
While certain objects arc weapons by design, for instance, a handgun
or a switch-blade, other objects become weapons only when there is
some general intent for them to be a weapon. For instance, if an indi•
vidual carries a bat to the baseball field for a game, the bat is certainly
not a weapon. However, if the individual should swing the bat pur•
posely at another, the bat then becomes a weapon. Similarly. a car

120. Id. at 703-04.
121. Id. at 705-06.
122. Id. at 706.
123. /d.
124. Id.
125. Id. (emphasis added).
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driven f o r purposes oftransportatio11 is 11ot a weapon. but a car driven
with the purpose o f inj11ring another definitely is a weapon. 126
The D.C. court divides the deadly weapon and dangerous instrument categories (to use Missouri's categories) along the line o f purpose. Some things just
are dangerous, and i f you use them, it seems fair to hold you responsible for
adding a further element o f risk to the situation. Other things are not necessarily dangerous - but they become dangerous i f you intend to use them in a
way that makes them dangerous: you swing a bat at someone or you drive
your car at someone. It is not the inherent "desi g n " o f the object that makes
it dangerous - that a car is heavy and can go fast, for example, or that a knife
is sharp - but what you do with it. ll'i That is what changes the object into a
dangerous instrument.
This way o f looking at dangerous instruments does not mean that cars
are never dangerous instruments, only that the person must have the purpose
o f using them that way. And this is the better way to analyze the knife cases,
too. Do not just look - as Baumann seems to do - at whether anyone was
around who could be harmed by the knife.1l8 Look at how the knife was being used. Was it being used in a threatening manner? Then it is probably
being used as a dangerous instrument. Indeed, even i f the cases are not explicit on this point, what most courts do in the knife cases is look at whether
the circumstances allow an inference o f intent. Does the way the knife was
used "under the circumstances" show that the person had the purpose o f causing harm? I f so, then the knife was being used as a dangerous instrument and
not as an "ordinary object." One case (Hyman) proceeded in exactly this
way. "Holding a knife to someone's throat in order to get them to remain
silent," the court wrote, "is using that knife 'in a threatening manner.' Therefore, Appellant's use o f the knife under these circumstances qualifies as use
o f a 'dangerous instrument. " ' 129 The fact that the knife was not just being
held, but held against someone's throat as a way o f threatening that person,
demonstrates the purpose of using the object as a dangerous instrument. It is
not merely the fact that a person is present that makes the knife "readily capable" o f causing hann but rather the intention o f the person using the knife.
In most cases - as the actual knife opinions reveal - this will be rather easy to
show.
Another example might help. In Coram, the defendant was accused o f
using a telephone as a dangerous instrument by throwing it at someone. 130 In
most contexts, just having a phone would not give rise to any inference that it
can cause serious physical injury or death. However, a cell phone docs be-

126. Id. (quoting Recd v. United States, 584 A.2d 585, 588-89 (D.C. 1990) (emphasis added)).
127. See id.
128. Slate v. Baumann, 217 S.W.3d 914,919 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).
129. Slale v. Hyman, 11 S.W.3d 838,841 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
130. Slate v. Coram, 231 S.W.3d 865, 867 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).
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come dangerous i f you throw it - hard - at someone. A person who throws a
cell phone at someone does, probably, know that he or she is using the phone
in a way that makes it "readily capable" o f causing serious harm. But here
the knowledge is almost certainly parasitic on the purpose the person had in
throwing the phone - he or she threw the phone i11 order to cause the harm
and was aware that it might do so. And indeed we can easily infer from the
facts in Coram that the purpose o f throwing the phone was to cause serious
physical injury - "a phone was thrown at the head o f an incapacitated, 93year-old man from a close range with such force that it caused serious bruising and a black eye still noticeable four days after the event."13t If a person
"knowingly uses" an object in a way that is readily capable o f causing serious
physical injury, he or she will in nearly every case be found, also, to have
"purposely" used the object in that way, 132 so long as the features o f the object are such that it can cause serious physical injury or death.133 What the
emphasis on purpose rules out are those cases where actors know they have
an object that can hurt people badly, but they have no intention o f using the
object in that way.
In the end, we suspect that most courts simply read "knowingly use" as
meaning the same as "purpose." But the two are analytically distinct, and in
fact, this distinction becomes apparent in the car cases (as well as some knife
cases). Anyone who drives a car or holds a knife knows that he or she is using something that is readily capable o f causing serious physical injury or
death (if there are people around), but one may not intend in any way to use
the car or the knife in order to cause serious physical injury or death. Consider one more example: a surgeon who is operating on someone is aware that
he or she is using the knife in a circumstance in which one wrong move
means serious physical injury or death. Is the knife a dangerous instrument
I3 I. Id. at 868.
132. See, e.g., State v. Hand, 305 S.W.3d 476,481 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (citing
Stale v. Eoff, 193 S.W.3d 366, 374 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006)) (referring to Eoff as a case
in which the appeals court "found that when a stick or club was used in the course of
a robbery as a bludgeon . . . no reasonable jury could have found that, under the circumstances in which it was used, the stick did not qualify as a dangerous instrument").
133. For a bizarre case that seems to depart with this second requirement (i.e., that
the object in the circumstances be able to cause harm), see State v. Ransburg, 504
S.W.3d 721, 724 (Mo. 2016) (en bane) (stick found to be dangerous instrument because "Ransburg's conscious object was, if he reached the man, to cause physical
injury to the man by using the stick under circumstances in which it was readily capable of causing serious physical injury"). This extends the "circumstances of use" to
absurdity, at least if read out of context. In fact, the case deals with the slightly different question of whether Ransburg had the "conscious object" to use the long stick
as a dangerous instrument, not whether the stick was i11 f a c t in the circumstances a
"dangerous instrument." Jd. This has not stopped courts from using the case as precedent for the idea that a pipe could be a dangerous instrument, even if no one was
around. See State v. Brittain, 539 S.W.3d 925, 929 (Mo. Ct. App.), tra11sfer denied (Mo. Mar. I, 2018).
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under the statute? 134 Setting the standard at "knowing" means that it is; setting the standard at "purpose" means that it is not. We think the requirement
o f purpose gives the better answer - it is the purpose the surgeon has that
makes the knife an instrument o f healing, as opposed to a deadly weapon.
But there are some instances where the focus on "purpose" could lead to
a finding o f a dangerous instrument where the more "objective" reading
would not. For example, it does not seem entirely wrong to say that one's
fists are a dangerous object if one has the i11tellt to use them in a way that can
cause serious physical injury or death (if you repeatedly punch someone in
the head). The subjective reading focuses less on the exact nature or characteristics o f the object - and, perhaps, also whether the thing is exactly an "instrument, article, or substance" - and more on the intention o f the person who
employs that object. 135 As the court in Id/ebird wrote, in finding that fire was
in the circumstances a dangerous instrument, "what constitutes an instrument,
article or substance does not depend on the basic physical characteristics or
typical use o f the thing in question, but rather on whether it was used by defendant as the mechanism (or instrument) for causing death or serious physical injury to the victim.''136 The subjective interpretation o f "dangerous instrument," in focusing on the purpose for which the object was being used,
allows this broader reading and so may encompass, for example, fists. And
in doing so it arguably focuses on the thing that matters - whether the situation was being made more hannful by the defendant's use o f the object, rather than just on the mere presence or attributes o f the object, regardless o f
what the defendant was using the object for.
In Williams, the court explicitly overturned the cases in which intent
was held to be a necessary factor in finding something to be a dangerous instrument.137 The court's rejection o f these cases can be challenged. The
court says that cases like Pogue and ld/ebird arc mistaken insofar as they
require an extra clement o f proof - proof o f subjective intent - that is "not in
the statute." 138 But Pogue has an answer to this. What is in the statute is a
requirement that the state show that "under the circumstances" the object was
134. O f course, the surgeon could not be charged with Anned Criminal Action,
but the broader point still holds: intent seems lo be crucial in figuring out whether the
knife is really "dangerous" or not.
13S. This is similar to the Alaska approach we canvassed earlier.
136. State v. ldlebird, 896 S.W.2d 656, 66S (Mo. Ct. App. 1995), ow!rn1/ed en
ba11c by State v. Williams, 126 S.W.3d 377 (Mo. 2004).
137. Williams, 126 S.W.3d at 385.
138. The court stated:
Pogue appears to add an clement o f proof - subjective intent to injure for the prosecution that is not in the statute. To the extent that Pogue, Jdfebird, and Dowdy would require a showing that the defendant had a subjective
intent lo cause death or serious physical injury, they should not be followed.

Id.
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readily capable o f causing serious physical injury or death. "Circumstances"
is in the statute, and Pogue says that the most relevant circumstance, under a
plain reading o f the statute, is the purpose o f using the object to cause
harm.139 Moreover, the Williams court violates its own admonition not to
read an additional element o f proof by saying that whether something is a
dangerous instrument "tum[s] on whether the defendant k11owi11gly used the
object in a manner in which it was readily capable o f causing death or serious
physical injury." 140 Knowingly, like purposely, is a mental state that is not
explicitly in the statute - the court infers that the legislature meant to put it
there, same as the court did in Pogue. So the actual disagreement is whether
knowledge or purpose makes better sense o f the statute, not whether there is a
mental element to the definition o f "dangerous instrument." 14 1 It seems to us,
again, that the Pogue court has the better argument. Merely knowing that
something is readily capable o f causing hann does not make it dangerous,
does not tum it into a weapon rather than an ordinary object; it is rather the
intent with which one is using the object that matters to the dangerousness
inquiry. 142

V. C O N C L U S I O N
The use o f Armed Criminal Action as a sentencing enhancement is
ubiquitous in Missouri - it is an easy way to add a few more years to any
sentence. For a while, it looked as i f the ACA statute would fall under a double jeopardy challenge, but this was rebuffed by the United States Supreme

139. According to the Pogue court:
The state's argument docs not attach sufficient significance to the words,
"under the circumstances in which it is used," that arc part of the definition of
"dangerous instrument" in (section 556.061(20)]. The statute requires more
than a showing that an article is readily capable of causing death or serious
physical injury. It requires more than a showing that the article was the instrument that produced the death of a person. Phrases are considered "in their
plain or ordinary and usual sense."
In detennining the circumstances in which defendant used his automobile
at the time in question, the user's intent and motive must be considered.
State v. Pogue, 851 S.W.2d 702, 706 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (citation omitted), over111/ed e n bane by Williams, 126 S.W.3d 377.
140. Williams, 126 S.W.3d at 384 (emphasis added).
141. We have already registered our skepticism that lower courts in most cases are
reading "knowingly use" as the same as purpose.
142. We take it as a welcome - rather than unfortunate - implication of this interpretation of "dangerous instrument" that it implicitly makes the mens rea of Armed
Criminal Action into "purpose" when it comes to an ACA/dangcrous instrument
charge.
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Court.143 As it is used now, the ACA statute is a good example of"overcriminalization" at work because it shows a criminal justice system increasing
punishment in cases where a person is already guilty o f a felony. The real
crime has been proven - and if you can prove the underlying crime, you get
the ACA charge tacked on for free. The more broadly the ACA statute is
read, including the terms "deadly weapon" and "dangerous instrument,"
which form the basis o f an ACA charge, the more overcriminalization becomes just a fact o f the Missouri criminal justice system. Cases that look bad
enough, such as when someone is charged with involuntary manslaughter for
recklessly hitting a pedestrian with his or her car, become worse when an
ACA charge is added. Again, the ACA conviction is almost automatic, provided the underlying felony has been proven. And the courts have made it
even worse by reading the statute as requiring that the time be served, no
exceptions.144
It is easy to attack overcriminalization in the abstract - there are too
many criminal laws, which result in too many people being charged and convicted and put away into prison for too long. It is harder to point out specific
instances where the criminal law needs to be cut back - commission o f nearly
any crime creates a victim who might object to lessening the punishment,
narrowing the interpretation o f the law, or eliminating the crime altogether.
The ACA is a good example o f a specific statute that can and probably should
be narrowed. The ACA already represents a kind o f overkill - a gift to prosecutors who have already secured the real prosecution for the felony offense.
The statute itself looks redundant and so for that reason (as we suggested
earlier) should probably be given a narrow reading. I f the prosecution is going to get a few free extra years tacked onto the sentence, we should be careful about letting it have this benefit indiscriminately. The statute is broad
enough as it is; courts should not be making it even broader (contra the
court's opinion in Jones 145) . And the state should be required to prove that

143. The Court stated:
Particularly in light of recent precedents of this Court, it is clear that the Missouri Supreme Court has misperceived the nature of the Double Jeopardy
Clause's protection against multiple punishments. With respect to cumulative
sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more
than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than
the legislature intended.
Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359,366 (1983).
144. "The armed criminal action statute prescribes its own penalty by setting a
minimum sentence at 'a term of not less than three years.' Because anned criminal
action has no classification and includes its own penalty, it is an unclassified code
offense." State v. Hyman, 37 S.W.3d 384,390 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
14S. State v. Jones, 479 S.W.3d 100, 106 (Mo. 2016) (en bane).
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the defendant meant to use the object in a dangerous way, not just that he or
she knew he or she was dealing with something dangerous.146
But even apart from general worries about overcriminalization in the
criminal justice system, our reading that focuses on the purpose o f those who
use ordinary objects as weapons seems to us to place the best interpretation o f
the statute. It is the best both in tenns o f the state's interest in getting tough
on people who make criminal situations worse by making things more dangerous (intentionally) and o f the defendant's interest in receiving adequate
notice for what he or she will be punished for ifhe or she does certain things.
What really makes the situation dangerous is not merely the object - again,
the objects in the dangerous instrument statute are those that in most circumstances are relatively innocuous - but what is being done 011 purpose with the
object. What makes the car or the knife or the ice pick or one's hands readily
capable o f causing harm is having a person who is ready and willing to use it
to cause hann. It is by focusing on this, and not on the intrinsic or inherent or
objective properties o f the object and the circumstances, that w e arrive at a
more plausible, and w e think fairer, reading o f the statute.

146. In this respect, we argue on a more granular level what Gideon Yaffe has
urged on a macro level. See his op-ed, Gideon Yaffe, Opinion, A Republican Crime
Proposal T/rat Democrats S/ro11/d Back, N . Y . TIMES (Feb. 12, 2016),
hnps://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/12/opinion/a-republican-crime-proposal-thatdemoc rats-should-back.html (noting that "over the years, exceptions to the principle
[that a crime should require proof o f a 1,>t1ilty mind] have become common because
mens rea requirements have not been consistently detailed in laws").
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